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USING THE IIED TORT TO ADDRESS DISCRIMINATION
AND RETALIATON IN THE WORKPLACE
Alex B. Long*
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of study and effort, workplace discrimination and
harassment remain intractable problems.
There is no shortage of
suggestions in academic literature as to how to reform the law in order to
combat workplace discrimination and harassment.1 As one author has
noted, the #MeToo movement prompted “a flurry of proposed and enacted
legislative reform” designed to address sexual harassment.2 While the
Black Lives Matter movement was originally focused on criminal justice
reform, the movement has also triggered increased attention to inequality
and harassment in the workplace.3
Despite the attention devoted to these problems, however, there remains
a sense that discrimination law, as currently constituted, has come up short
in the fight against workplace discrimination and harassment.4 For
example, Supreme Court decisions in the late 1990s encouraged employers
to develop policies and training designed to educate employees concerning
workplace discrimination and harassment as a means of avoiding punitive
damage awards and shielding employers altogether from vicarious liability
for supervisor harassment.5 The thought was that such training would
*

Williford Gragg Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Thanks to Nicole Buonocore Porter for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to
Morgan Webber, Michael Trotter, and Will Hitchcock for their research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18 (2018) (offering proposals for
reform).
2
See Julie Goldscheid, Sexual Assault by Federal Actors, #MeToo, and Civil Rights,
94 WASH. L. REV. 1639, 1679 (2019).
3
See Molly Gibbons, Comment, License to Offend: How the NLRA Shields
Perpetrators of Discrimination in the Workplace, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1526–27 (2020)
(noting that the movement “has prompted a discussion regarding the ways in which racism
arises in other areas of life, such as the workplace”).
4
See Goldscheid, supra note 2, at 1679 (stating that the fact that “sexual harassment
on the job persists over thirty years since the [first major judicial decision on the subject],
confirms that law, or at least the legal frameworks embodied in current anti-discrimination
laws, have had limited results”).
5
See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal
Incentives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 66–
67 (2018) (discussing cases).
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reduce instances of workplace harassment.6 But the stories from the
#MeToo movement and the continued prevalence of race-based and other
forms of harassment have tended to call into question the effectiveness of
anti-harassment training as currently implemented.7
Given the dominant role that Title VII and other anti-discrimination
statutes play in this regard, most of the suggestions regarding how to make
the law more effective in combatting discrimination and harassment involve
statutory reform.8 But it is worth noting that tort law has also long played a
role in the law governing the workplace as it relates to discrimination and
harassment. Whether it involves the Supreme Court’s repeated decisions to
import tort law principles into Title VII jurisprudence or plaintiffs’
decisions to include tort claims supplementing or replacing traditional
statutory discrimination claims, tort law plays a role in addressing
employment discrimination.9
Perhaps the most common tort claim that employees assert in instances
of alleged workplace discrimination or harassment is the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). When subjected to racial or sexual
harassment or the creation of a hostile work environment, employees
sometimes allege that the conduct amounts to IIED.10 Unfortunately for
employees, it is notoriously difficult for employees to prevail on IIED
claims against their employers. Liability under the tort is limited to begin
with, even outside of the employment context.11 Not only must a plaintiff
establish that a defendant intentionally or recklessly caused severe
emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct
was “extreme and outrageous” or “beyond all bounds of decency.”12 This is
a difficult standard to satisfy in general, but when the defendant is an
6

See id.
See id. at 68 (stating that anti-harassment training, “at least as generally practiced,
does not prevent harassment”).
8
See Goldscheid, supra note 2, at 1681–87 (listing proposed legislative reforms).
9
See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV 2115, 2132–34 (2007) (discussing IIED cases
in which courts have been willing to permit recovery for workplace harassment); Sandra F.
Sperino, Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 (2016)
(discussing the courts’ importation of common-law tort principles into Title VII
jurisprudence).
10
See, e.g., Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999 (N.M. 1999).
11
See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1988) (noting the difficulties
employees face); Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
in the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 122 (2003)
(summarizing cases illustrating difficulties employees face in establishing extreme and
outrageous conduct).
12
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
7
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employer, the difficulty level for a plaintiff increases dramatically. Citing
the need to preserve managerial discretion, courts espouse the need to adopt
an “especially strict approach” in IIED cases in the workplace.13
As a result of this strict approach, employees are frequently unable to
establish that employer misconduct satisfies this high threshold. There are
numerous examples of employees bringing IIED claims against employers
who have engaged in some fairly horrific forms of conduct, only to be told
by courts that the conduct is not egregious enough to be actionable.14 This
strict approach also applies to instances of unlawful employment
discrimination and harassment. In short, the general rule among courts is
that conduct that amounts to unlawful discrimination under Title VII or
some other anti-discrimination statute does not ordinarily rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of an IIED claim.15
At the same time, a few courts—almost undetected in the literature on
the subject—have recognized that one form of employer conduct may merit
special treatment when assessing an IIED claim against an employer.
According to these courts, the fact that an employer has engaged in
retaliatory conduct may be “a critical and prominent” factor in assessing an
employer’s behavior.16 And where an employer engages in discriminatory
conduct and then retaliates against an employee who opposes such conduct,
these courts have also been more willing to find that the employee may
have engaged in the type of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to
support an IIED claim.17
This Article champions the approaches these courts have taken and uses
them as a jumping off point for a broader discussion of the evils of
employment retaliation and how more robust policing of employment
retaliation may more effectively deter discrimination in the workplace. One
13

Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indust., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 478 (8th Cir. 2010); infra notes
88–98 and accompanying text.
14
See McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (concluding that employer who made a racially discriminatory statement to
employee and who fired employee after employee refused to sign a false affidavit did not
engage in extreme and outrageous conduct); Hooten v. Pa. College of Optometry, 601 F.
Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (concluding that harassing plaintiff at work about her
status as a wife and mother in front of other co-worker and purposely overloading
plaintiff’s work schedule was not extreme and outrageous); Shewmaker v. Minchew, 504
F. Supp. 156, 163 (D.D.C. 1980) (concluding that harassment, exclusion of the plaintiff
from business meetings, and circulation of rumors concerning plaintiff was not actionable);
Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397, 406–07 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that
president of company who, inter alia exposed his genitals to plaintiff and publicly
embarrassed plaintiff did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct).
15
See infra notes 126–131 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 213–226 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 213–237 and accompanying text.
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frequent theme in the literature on employment retaliation is that more
robust statutory protection from employment retaliation is necessary in the
fight against employment discrimination so that employees are not deterred
from speaking out against discrimination for fear of retaliation.18 This
Article suggests that, given the gaps in existing statutory law, the IIED tort
may also supplement statutory law in this fight. But, drawing social science
research into the subject of retaliation, this Article also focuses on what one
court has referred to as the “greater detrimental impact upon the victim” that
retaliation has on employees.19 Based on the special harms that retaliation
inflicts on victims, this Article argues that courts should recognize
retaliatory conduct as an especially weighty factor in deciding whether
conduct is extreme and outrageous for purposes of IIED claims, particularly
where it is coupled with discriminatory conduct.
Part I of this Article begins with a discussion of the “extreme and
outrageous” conduct requirement of the IIED tort, including a discussion of
some of the markers or indicators of such conduct. Part II focuses on IIED
claims in the workplace and the strict approach that courts have taken
regarding such claims, even when the employer conduct in question
involves unlawful discrimination. It also focuses on the decisions of those
courts that view retaliation as a prominent factor in assessing whether an
employer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous. Part III examines the ways
in which IIED claims might serve to fill the gaps in existing statutory
discrimination law in the case of employer retaliation stemming from an
employee’s opposition to discrimination or harassment. Finally, Part IV
examines the social science literature on employer retaliation in order to
better explain the harmful effects on employees. Specifically, it argues that
because employment retaliation is so emotionally damaging and because
retaliation is so likely to deter employees from complaining about
potentially unlawful employee conduct like discrimination, courts should
recognize retaliation as a prominent factor in assessing whether an
employer’s conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct
and should ordinarily classify retaliation in response to resistance to
discrimination as creating at least a jury issue on the issue of whether the
conduct was extreme and outrageous.

18
See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 38 (2005) (noting
that retaliation against employees tends to make other similarly-situated employees less
inclined to speak about discrimination); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by
Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 51 (2018) (attributing the
underreporting of workplace discrimination to the fear of retaliation).
19
See infra notes 213–226 and accompanying text.
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EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT IN THE IIED TORT

A. The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort of “outrage” or IIED is a dignitary tort, designed to compensate
those who, in the words of Kenneth Abraham and G. Edward White, have
been treated “in a way that does not respect that person's intrinsic worth.”20
Tort law was historically reluctant to permit recovery in the absence of
physical injury.21 Concerns over permitting recovery in such instances
included the difficulty in establishing causation and the possibility of
fakery.22 The original version of the Restatement of Torts did not recognize
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and it was not until a
later supplement in 1948 that the tort first appeared.23 But the authors—
relying in part on the scholarship of William Prosser24 and Calvert
Magruder25—went to considerable lengths to limit the potential reach of the
new tort.
First, liability only attaches where the defendant acts recklessly or with
the intent to cause severe emotional distress.26 Distress is “severe” where a
reasonable person cannot be expected to endure it.27 In addition to limiting
recovery to situations in which a plaintiff suffered “severe emotional
distress,” the authors also imposed a high hurdle for plaintiffs to clear in
establishing the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct. A defendant’s
conduct must be “extreme and outrageous,” that is “beyond all possible
bounds of decency [so as] to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.”28 This rather amorphous definition
aside, the concept of extreme and outrageous conduct is more frequently

20

Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 317, 320, 335 (2019).
21
See Russell Fraker, Reforming Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort
IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2008) (discussing the history of tort law pertaining to
emotional distress).
22
See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Torts Law, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 463, 494 (1998) (“There were fears that plaintiffs could easily fake injuries
and that it would be impossible to trace the invisible causal chain from the accident to the
plaintiff's injury.”).
23
See Fraker, supra note 21, at 988.
24
See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
25
See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
26
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
27
Id. cmt. j.
28
Id. cmt. d.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813251

6

DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION & IIED

[26-Mar-21

described by courts in terms of what such conduct is not.29 Famously,
extreme and outrageous conduct does not include “mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”30
IIED claims may be limited in other ways. For example, IIED claims
are frequently asserted alongside other claims. But a few courts view IIED
as a gap-filler tort that applies “in those rare instances in which a defendant
intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual that
the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.”31 Under this
approach, a plaintiff may not recover on an IIED claim where the plaintiff
could recover under a more traditional tort theory, such as battery or
assault.32 This same idea has also been applied in the case of recovery for
sexual harassment under both a statutory cause of action and IIED.33 Thus,
for example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may not
avoid the statutory cap on damages recoverable in a statutory sexual
harassment action by also tacking on an IIED claim based on the same
conduct.34
B. Markers of Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
Courts routinely emphasize that the “extreme and outrageous conduct”
requirement imposes a demanding standing.35 But the lack of a clear
standard defining the concept of extreme and outrageous conduct is one of
the defining traits of the IIED tort. As explained by one author, “the
threshold of liability under IIED is nothing other than the degrees of
opprobrium and hyperbole that the defendant's behavior inspires in the eyes

29

See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating the
concept escapes precise definition); Fraker, supra note 21, at 994 (stating that “[t]he
Restatement commentary effectively concedes the impossibility of precise definition”).
30
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
31
Standard Fruit and Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998); see
also Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 481 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he tort of outrage is
intended as a ‘gap-filler,’ providing redress for extreme emotional distress where
traditional common law actions do not.”).
32
See Banks, 39 S.W.3d at 481 (“Where an actor's conduct amounts to the commission
of one of the traditional torts such as assault, battery, or negligence for which recovery for
emotional distress is allowed, and the conduct was not intended only to cause extreme
emotional distress in the victim, the tort of outrage will not lie.”).
33
See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004).
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., Chang Hyun Moon v. Kang Jun Liu, 44 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ill. Ct. App.
2015) (stating that the element “sets a high bar for the type of conduct that will create
liability”); Atkinson v. Farley, 431 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (referring to
threshold for such conduct as “formidable”).
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of the court.”36 As Judge Judith Kaye once observed, “The tort is as
limitless as the human capacity for cruelty.”37
This definitional difficulty raises at least two concerns for courts. One
is the concern previously identified: the tort “may overlap with other areas
of law, with potential liability for conduct that is otherwise lawful.”38
Relatedly, the lack of clear standards sometimes leads to unpredictable
outcomes.39 For example, a court may rely heavily on the fact that the
defendant is merely exercising a legal right, hence the conduct is not
extreme and outrageous.40 Where, however, the defendant’s conduct goes
beyond what is necessary to exercise that right, the conduct may be
actionable.41
While there is no clear definition of the concept of extreme and
outrageous conduct, the Restatement (Third) of Torts at least lists several
potential indicators of such conduct. These include “the relationship of the
parties, whether the actor abused a position of authority over the other
person, whether the other person was especially vulnerable and the actor
knew of the vulnerability, the motivation of the actor, and whether the
conduct was repeated or prolonged.”42
1. The Relationship of the Parties
According to at least one court, the most important factor in the
determination of whether conduct was extreme and outrageous is whether a
special relationship existed.43 Where such a relationship exists, a defendant
may have “a greater obligation to refrain from subjecting the victim to
abuse” and other forms of wrongful conduct than a stranger would.44 Thus,
the existence of a special relationship generally makes it easier for the
36

Fraker, supra note 21, at 994.
Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993).
38
Id.
39
See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 63 (1982) (referring to the results of IIED cases as being
unpredictable); Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 55–56 (2012) (stating that the lack of clear standards concerning
this element leads to unpredictable results).
40
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
41
See id.
42
Id. cmt. d.
43
House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
44
Williams v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 958 P.2d 202, 204 (Or. Ct. App.
1998); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2005)
(stating that “a special relationship between the parties may lower the level of conduct
needed to be actionable”).
37

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813251

8

DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION & IIED

[26-Mar-21

plaintiff to satisfy the “extreme and outrageous conduct” requirement.45
Special relationships can include the employer/employee relationship, the
landlord/tenant relationship, the physician/patient relationship, the
debtor/creditor relationship, and the church/congregation member
relationship.46
2. Abuse of a Position of Authority
The fact that the defendant was in a position of authority or in a relation
with the plaintiff that gives the defendant actual or apparent authority over
the plaintiff or the power to affect the plaintiff’s interests is another factor
cutting in favor of a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.47
Examples include police officers, school authorities, and landlords.48 The
fact that a defendant occupies a position of power over the plaintiff
enhances the ability of the defendant to inflict emotional distress.49 As
explained by one court, “[t]he anxiety and loss of control felt by one who
cannot protect his vital interests” may be an aggravating factor in the
consideration of whether conduct is extreme and outrageous.50 Indeed,
Prosser and Keeton note that the leverage that one in a position of authority
enjoys over another may be “something very like extortion.”51 Thus, a
police officer’s racial slurs uttered during the course of an interrogation may
be actionable where such slurs would not be actionable if coming from a
private citizen or even a public official not having the power to affect the
plaintiff’s interests.52
3. Vulnerability of the Plaintiff
The fact that the defendant is aware that the plaintiff is particularly
susceptible to emotional distress due to some peculiarity may also makes it
more likely that the defendant’s conduct will be deemed as extreme and
45
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“It is
only where there is a special relation between the parties . . . that there may be recovery for
insults not amounting to extreme outrage.”).
46
See Hicks, 179 P.3d at 737.
47
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1964); see also
Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747 (D. Md. 1996).
48
See id.
49
See Ky. Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 15 (Md. 1992)
(stating that an individual’s position of power “may enhance his or her ability to do harm”).
50
See Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1567, 1572 (S.D. Ga.
1995).
51
PROSSER & KEETON, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (5th ed. 1984).
52
See Ky. Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 607 A.2d at 15 (stating that an individual’s
position of power “may enhance his or her ability to do harm”).
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outrageous.53 The “peculiarity” may be physical, emotional, or even
financial.54 Where a defendant acts recklessly or with the intent to inflict
emotional distress and is already on notice that the victim is susceptible to
emotional distress, the conduct may cross the line into extreme and
outrageous behavior where it otherwise might not.55 In the words of one
court, such conduct may become “heartless, flagrant, and outrageous.”56
4. Motivation of the Defendant
The defendant’s motivation is perhaps the least theorized of the factors
listed in the Restatement.57 The decisional law suggests that the actor’s
motive is a factor to consider and that some type of wrongful motivation
may compound the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, thus making it
extreme and outrageous.58 The fact that a defendant was motivated by
53

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1964).
See Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (involving
denial of payment of life insurance benefits and high pressure tactics in an attempt to force
a settlement); Langer v. George Washington University, 498 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C.
2007) (involving plaintiff who was known by defendant to be in a “fragile mental state”
and physically susceptible to emotional distress); Holmes v. Oxford Chemicals, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 915, 919 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (involving defendant who slashed plaintiff's disability
income in the hope that such drastic action might force plaintiff to seek Social Security
benefits).
55
Cf. Langer v. George Washington Univ., 498 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2007)
(noting that while employer-employee conflicts generally do not rise to the level of
outrageous conduct, plaintiff stated a claim where employer was aware of employee’s
vulnerability to harassment and continued to harass employee).
56
Langer, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
57
The defendant’s motivation was not listed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
as being a relevant consideration in the determination of extreme and outrageous conduct.
While the concept is listed in a comment within § 46 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012), none of the
comments or illustrations included speak in any depth on the concept.
58
See Dale v. City of Chi. Heights, 672 F. Supp. 330, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (stating that
defendant’s discriminatory animus compounded the wrongfulness of defendant’s conduct
and that plaintiff had alleged extreme and outrageous conduct); Schmitz v. Smentowski,
785 P.2d 726, 735 (N.M. 1990) (listing the defendant’s motive as a factor to consider);
Taylor v. State, 617 So.2d 1198, 1204 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the fact that
defendant acted with an ulterior motive in concluding that conduct could be extreme and
outrageous); Gital Dodelson, Outrage: Withholding a Get as Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 240, 257 (2014) (“When a man chooses
to ruin his wife's present and future life out of hatred and spite, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress can be used to provide a remedy for the tremendous anguish
that he causes.”). Various authors have suggested that racially-motivated speech or
conduct can be actionable under an IIED theory in some cases. See Hafsa S. Mansoor,
Modern Racism, but Old-Fashioned IIED: How Incongruous Injury Standards Deny
“Thick Skin” Plaintiffs Redress for Racism and Ethnoviolence, 50 SETON HALL L. REV.
54
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racial animus, malice, or some other improper motive would logically seem
to contribute to the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct.59
At the same time, the Restatement notes the fact that a defendant’s
conduct “has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort” does
not necessarily make the conduct extreme and outrageous.60 Courts
frequently observe that a wrongful motivation alone does not render
conduct extreme and outrageous and that, ultimately, the focus must be on
the nature of the defendant’s conduct itself.61 And in order for the
defendant’s wrongful motive to tip the balance, the underlying conduct
must itself be fairly egregious.62 Thus, in a New Mexico case, the fact that
the defendant was “motivated in significant part by a malicious intent to
injure” the plaintiff when he initiated sexual relationships with the
plaintiff’s ex-wife, then-current wife, and former fiancée was insufficient to
render this conduct extreme and outrageous.63
One recurring scenario involves a defendant who is motivated by a
desire to humiliate another.64 The fact that the defendant publicly
humiliated the plaintiff makes it more likely that the conduct will be
881, 887 (2020) (citing author).
59
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(explaining that the defendant’s motive is a relevant consideration in determining whether a
defendant’s interference with another’s contractual relation is improper and stating that “[a]
motive to injure another or to vent one's ill will on him serves no socially useful purpose”).
60
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1964).
61
See Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport, 43 A.3d 69, 101 (Conn. 2012)
(“[W]rongful motivation by itself does not meet the standard for intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress; rather, it is the act itself which must be outrageous.”) (quotations
omitted); Cohen v. Meyers, 167 A.3d 1157, 1182 (Conn. Ct. App. 2012) (“The court
properly focused on the conduct on which Meyers' claim was based, rather than by the
generalized characterizations of this conduct, regardless of the motivation behind that
conduct.”); Padwa v. Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the
fact that defendant may have motivated by malicious intent to injure was insufficient to
render conduct extreme and outrageous); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
767 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that the fact that a defendant’s conduct was
aggravated by malice that might be sufficient for an award of punitive damages under
another tort theory has not been enough to rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct).
62
Cf. Kelso v. Watson, 562 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (“Cremation of a
corpse against the wishes of the next-of-kin, if done maliciously, out of ill will or spite,
likewise could be conduct sufficiently outrageous to support that element of the tort.”).
63
Padwa, 981 P.2d at 1242.
64
See Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 67 (Cal. 1979) (involving supervisor who
used racial epithets in an attempt to humiliate plaintiff); Beavers v. Johnson Controls
World Servs., Inc., 901 P.2d 761, 763 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding jury could
properly find supervisor’s conduct to be extreme and outrageous where supervisor
subjected plaintiff to unjustified public harassment, ridicule, and humiliation).
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deemed extreme and outrageous.65 Prior to the recognition of the IIED tort,
there were numerous decisions allowing for recovery stemming from the
embarrassment and humiliation of guests, customers, and passengers by the
owners of places of public accommodations who removed them from their
facilities in a public manner.66 These decisions helped pave the way for
recognition of the IIED tort,67 and humiliation continues to play a role in
IIED cases today.68
Several of the illustrations of extreme and outrageous conduct listed in
the Restatement involve conduct designed solely to humiliate another or
humiliation in pursuit of some other goal.69 The Restatement provides the
example of a spouse seeking a divorce “who announces intimate facts in the
newspaper as part of the process of obtaining a divorce.”70 Other examples
from judicial decisions include a supervisor who allegedly mocked an
employee’s dwarfism for the purpose of humiliating the employee71 and
police officers who made racially derogatory comments about a suspect in
front of the suspect’s neighbors and then publicly celebrated his arrest.72
65
See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1466 (9th. Cir. 1994)
(“[W]here there is public humiliation it is much more likely that the [IIED] action will
lie.”); Bujnicki v. American Paving and Excavating, Inc., No. 99-CV-646S, 2002 WL
34691183, *8 (W.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 2002) (recognizing that “some combination of public
humiliation” and other factors may satisfy the extreme and outrageous standard); see also
Atakpa v. Perimeter OB-GYN Assocs., P.C., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1994)
(stating that defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
because even if defendant’s conduct was discriminatory, there was no evidence that it was
done out of any desire to humiliate the plaintiff); Beavers, 901 P.2d at 763 (involving
supervisor who allegedly humiliated and demeaned plaintiff in front of other workers).
66
See Elizabeth Sepper, A Missing Piece of the Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 73 (2019) (discussing cases); see also Chi., St. L. P.R. Co. v.
Holdridge, 20 N.E. 837, 839 (Ind. 1889) (stating, in context of case involving passenger
expelled from train, that “the fact that the wrong is done under circumstances of peculiar
indignity and degradation is to be considered as an element of compensation”); Chi. &
N.W. Ry. Co. v. Chisholm, 79 Ill. 584, 589 (Ill. 1875) (involving passenger who was
expelled from a train in front of a large group of people and who, therefore, may have
“endured feelings of shame and humiliation”).
67
See Magruder, supra note 25, at 1051–53 (discussing cases); Seppter, supra note 66,
at 73.
68
See Fletcher v. Starbucks Corp., No. 3:14-CV-01898 (JCH), 2015 WL 4250698, at
*4 (D. Conn. July. 13, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff was
allegedly denied access to restroom due to his race and this fact was made known to others
in the store).
69
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b ill. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); id. cmt.
e; id. cmt. j ill. 10.
70
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
71
See Pennell v. Vacation Reservation Ctr., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (E.D. Va.
2011).
72
See Hernandez v. County of Marin, No. 11-cv-03085-JST, 2013 WL 4525640, at *9
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5. Repeated or Prolonged Conduct
Conduct that is repeated or occurs over a prolonged period of time may
also nudge that conduct into the realm of extreme and outrageous conduct.73
Where individual instances of wrongful conduct amount to a pattern, the
conduct may rise to the level of extreme and outrageous where the
individual instances, standing alone, would not.74 One fact that may make
the defendant’s conduct particularly offensive in such cases is the fact that
the victim is not able to avoid the conduct.75 Another is the fact that the
defendant may be in a position to adversely impact the plaintiff.76 A clear
example is debt collection cases in which a debtor is subjected to hounding
by a creditor.77
6. The Nature of the Conduct
A final consideration is the nature of the conduct itself. The
Restatement makes clear that mere insults, annoyances, and the like do not
rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, at least if none of the
other indicators of such conduct are present.78 Similarly, the fact that the
defendant’s conduct merely amounts to the exercise of the defendant’s legal
rights is unlikely to result in a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.79
But the fact that the conduct goes beyond what is necessary to carry out this
exercise of a legal right may support a finding of extreme and outrageous
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013).
73
See Howard v. Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 861–62 (W.D. La. 1996)
(stating that a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment in the workplace may constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Boyle v. Wenk, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass.
1979) (“Repeated harassment . . . may compound the outrageousness of incidents which,
taken individually, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant liability”); Padwa v.
Hadley, 981 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (“We recognize that nonprivileged
conduct that is ‘already at the edge of outrageous’ may become actionable by virtue of its
repetition.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
74
See Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 428 (D.N.J. 1994) (denying motion to
dismiss where defendant’s alleged conduct amounted to a continuing pattern of
harassment).
75
See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 386 (2d ed. 2011).
76
See Margita v. Diamond Mortg. Corp., 406 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting the fact that mortgage company had “a great deal of power to affect plaintiffs'
credit rating and future borrowing ability”).
77
See Champlin v. Wash. Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985 (R.I. 1984) (discussing this
situation).
78
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
79
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
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conduct, at least where some other aggravating factor is present.80 Thus, the
heartless landlord who evicts an ill or destitute tenant has not engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct merely by evicting the tenant.81 But if the
same landlord makes unnecessary threats of violence or needlessly
humiliates the tenant, the conduct might be actionable.
Conduct is more likely to be deemed extreme and outrageous where it is
wrongful by reference to some objective indicia. The fact that there is some
other external decision that conduct is wrongful helps lead to the conclusion
that such conduct is, by its nature, more wrongful than the insults,
annoyances, and the like that are not actionable. So, for example, acts of
violence or threats of violence are one form of conduct that may render
otherwise proper conduct extreme and outrageous.82 Extortionate conduct
may also be actionable.83 Courts also sometimes point to the fact that a
defendant’s conduct violates a statute, offends the public policy underlying
a statute, or violates a profession’s ethical standards as a factor contributing
to a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.84
II. WORKPLACE IIED CASES

The clearest general theme to emerge from a review of IIED cases in the
workplace is that liability for IIED is more limited for conduct occurring in
the workplace than it is in other settings. One does not have to look deep
into the caselaw in the area to find the idea that courts have adopted “an
especially strict approach to outrage claims arising from employment
relationships”85 and that courts “have been particularly hesitant in finding
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims actionable within an
employment claim.”86 This idea appears repeatedly in workplace IIED
80

See id. cmt. e.
See id. 46 cmt. g, ill. 14.
82
See Dobbs, supra note 75, at § 386; see also Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v.
Mosley, 634 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. 2006) (concluding alleged conduct was not extreme and
outrageous because it was of short duration and was not physically threatening); Haverbush
v. Powelson, 551 N.W.2d 206, 234–35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (referencing defendant’s
threats of violence among other acts in affirming verdict for plaintiff).
83
See Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So.2d 406, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“When the
conduct smacks of extortion, this tort is likely to be present.”).
84
See Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984) (“Actions which
violate public policy may constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to state a cause of action
for infliction of emotional distress.”); Long, supra note 39, at 64–69 (discussing cases).
85
Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indust., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added).
86
Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Commc’ns of N.C., L.L.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794
(W.D.N.C. 2002).
81
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decisions, most often in cases in which the plaintiff loses on the issue of
whether the employer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.87 As
discussed, this is even true in the case of various forms of discriminatory
conduct. But as discussed below, a few courts view retaliatory conduct
stemming from opposition to discriminatory or harassing conduct as
meriting special consideration.
A. The “Especially Strict Approach” to Workplace IIED Claims
The caselaw involving IIED in the workplace makes plain that liability
for IIED is even more limited in the workplace than in other settings.88
There are obviously limits to this idea, such as where a supervisor’s
behavior involves threats of physical violence or similar conduct.89 But in
general, “only the most unusual” of supervisory actions are subject to
87

See Kirwin v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 665 F. Supp. 1034, 1040
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Plaintiff's allegations therefore fall far short of the strict standard
required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Cavico, supra
note 11, at 122 (“There are many cases that clearly illustrate the difficulty of
demonstrating extreme and outrageous conduct in an employment setting.”); Marina
Sorkina Amendola, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Workplace Perspective,
43 VT. L. REV. 93, 94 (2018) (noting the strict requirements and the fact that few plaintiffs
succeed).
88
See Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Liability for
emotional distress, as a common-law tort, is even more constrained in the employment
context.”); Cavico, supra note 11, at 180 (stating that a “synthesis of current case law”
reveals that “courts will scrutinize very carefully, strictly, and at times severely, the
instances of factual misconduct alleged to have given rise to the independent tort of
outrage, especially in an at will employment situation”). Prior to the 1980s, there were
relatively few claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress set in the non-union
workplace. With the tort still in its relative infancy, decisions were somewhat mixed in
terms of what sort of employer conduct could qualify as extreme and outrageous. Some
early workplace IIED claims were premised on the argument that the act of firing the
employees in question was, by itself, extreme and outrageous. Results in these cases were
mixed. See, e.g., Counce v. M. B. M. Co., 597 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979)
(denying employer’s motion for summary judgment); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets,
Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the act of firing is not, by itself,
extreme and outrageous conduct). As the traditional at-will employment rule went under
attack in the 1980s, courts saw an increase in the number of statutory discrimination,
contract, and tort claims against employers. See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law
of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 636–67 (1988) (discussing “judicial
cracks in the at will citadel” that took place during the 1980s); Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against “Tortification”
of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (1994) (discussing the
increased use of contract and tort theories during that time).
89
See GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 613 (Tex. 1999) (involving
supervisor who, in addition to subjecting employees to verbal abuse, physically threatened
employees).
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challenge in the form of an IIED claim.90 As an obvious example, it is wellestablished that the mere act of discharging an at-will employee does not
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.91
The presence of one or more of the indicators of extreme and outrageous
conduct that might lead to a jury question outside of the workplace setting
often do not have the same effect when the conduct occurs in the workplace.
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that a police
officer who extorts money through threats of arrest may have engaged in
extreme and outrageous behavior through the abuse of the officer’s position
of authority.92 But there are also decisions that conclude that when a
supervisor—who similarly occupies a position of authority over an
employee—conditions future employment on an employee’s submission to
the supervisor’s demands for sex, he has not, as a matter of law, engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct.93 Employers who subject employees to
excessive scorn or ridicule,94 make false accusations against employees,95
or impose grossly burdensome demands or working conditions on
employees96 are expressly or impliedly conditioning future employment on
their employees’ submission to these practices. In other contexts, these
90

See GTE Southwest, Inc., 998 S.W.2d at 613 (“Such extreme conduct exists in only
the most unusual of circumstances.”).
91
See Grandchamp v. United Air Lines, Inc., 854 F.2d 381, 384–85 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating “discharge from employment, without more, is not outrageous conduct”). In
contrast, the manner in which an employer fires an employee might be extreme and
outrageous, particularly where the employer abuses the employer’s authority. See Crump
v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 576 A.2d 441, 449 (Vt. 1990) (“[I]f the manner of termination
evinces circumstances of oppressive conduct and abuse of a position of authority vis-a-vis
plaintiff, it may provide grounds for the tort action.”).
92
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1964).
93
See McIsaac v. WZEW–FM Corp., 495 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1986) (finding as a
matter of law that the act of firing an employee because the employee rejected supervisor’s
advances is not extreme and outrageous conduct); see also Brewer v. Petroleum Suppliers,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 926, 934, 936 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that sexual “demands which, if
refused, carry a consequence of economic loss or loss of status at employment” are not
sufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct).
94
Cf. Moye v. Gary, 595 F. Supp. 738, 741–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (concluding that
subjecting employee to homophobic insults was not extreme and outrageous).
95
Cf. Hamilton v. School District of Columbia, 852 F. Supp. 2d 139, 153 (D.D.C.
2012); Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1247 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
96
See King v. Wiseway Super Ctr., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(holding that acts of “scheduling [plaintiff] improperly, not allowing her to perform her job
duties, not treating her as a manager, not giving her the information she needed, never
communicating with her, never training her, forcing her to work without breaks, and
making derogatory comments to others” did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct”); Stewart v. Parish of Jefferson, 668 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming
dismissal of IIED claim where supervisor, inter alia, increased the employee’s workload
and pressured employee to accept a demotion).
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sorts of actions by one in a position of authority might be actionable under
an IIED theory.97 In the workplace context, they generally are not.98
Similarly, the fact that an employer’s adverse employment actions are
motivated by a desire to make work so unpleasant that an employee quits is
also unlikely to amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.99 In Wilson v.
Monarch Paper Co.,100 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
[T]hat it is not unusual for an employer, instead of directly
discharging an employee, to create unpleasant and onerous work
conditions designed to force an employee to quit, i.e.,
“constructively” to discharge the employee. In short, although this
sort of conduct often rises to the level of illegality, except in the
most unusual cases it is not the sort of conduct, as deplorable as it
may sometimes be, that constitutes “extreme and outrageous”
conduct.101
The Fifth Circuit later expanded upon this language from Wilson and
explained that “an employer may call upon an employee to do more work
than other employees, use special reviews on a particular employee and not
on others to downgrade his performance, and institute long-range company
plans to move younger persons into sales and management positions
without engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct.”102
Summing up the status of the law as it existed in the late 1980s,
Professor Regina Austin observed, “[o]nly the extraordinary, the excessive,
and the nearly bizarre in the way of supervisory intimidation and
humiliation warrant judicial relief through the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. All other forms of supervisory conduct that cause
workers to experience emotional harm are more or less ‘trivial’ in the
terminology of the Restatement of Torts.”103 This observation remains
essentially accurate more than three decades later.
97
See Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming
jury verdict in IIED case involving police officers who “deliberately uttered false reports of
criminal activity”).
98
See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
99
See Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that
constructive discharge does not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Dollard v. Bd.
of Educ., 777 A.2d 714, 716–17 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing employee’s IIED claim based on
employer alleged “concerted plan and effort to force the plaintiff to resign from her
position or to become so distraught that they would have a colorable basis for terminating
her employment”).
100
939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991).
101
Id. at 1143.
102
Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 515 (5th Cir. 1994).
103
Austin, supra note 11, at 18.
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B. Justifications for the “Especially Strict Approach” to Workplace IIED
Claims
Courts are not always explicit as to why the concept of extreme and
outrageous conduct—which the Restatement already warns should be
narrowly cabined104—should be construed especially narrowly in the
workplace context.105 To the extent courts explain why a stricter approach
is justified, they typically do so on the grounds of preserving the
employment-at-will rule and the employer discretion that goes along with
it.106 Courts have noted that “every employer must on occasion review,
criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees,”107 and unless liability
is limited to only “truly egregious” employer conduct, nearly every
employee would have a cause of action.”108 Thus, the narrow approach
preserves the at-will rule not only by prohibiting claims based on firings but
also claims based on day-to-day managerial decisions.109 This narrow
approach obviously helps to shield employers from liability for their own
actions and those of their supervisors.110
104

See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
Chamallas, supra note 126, at 2132 (stating that courts “rarely explain” why they
are “particularly hesitant” to recognize workplace IIED claims “and cite to nonemployment precedents as well as general principles of law to justify their decisions”).
106
See Lapidus v. N.Y.C. Chapter of the N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc.,
504 N.Y.S.2d 629, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (explaining that plaintiff who was allegedly
fired in a humiliating manner should not be allowed to “subvert the traditional at-will
contract rule by casting his cause of action in terms of a tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress”). See generally Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717
(Tenn. 1997) (explaining that “[t]he employment-at-will doctrine recognizes that
employers need freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from
the courts”); William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the
Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 152–53 (2003) (noting the “the wide berth given to
management prerogative under employment at will”).
107
Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991).
108
Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2017).
109
There are obviously exceptions in which a supervisor engages in truly horrifying
behavior. In Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 606 (7th Cir. 2006), the
supervisor’s actions included “forcing Ms. Naeem to climb up an unstable metal stairway
to hook up computer equipment during her pregnancy; sabotaging Ms. Naeem's computer
to deny her access and alter her files; publicly criticizing Ms. Naeem's work during
meetings with other supervisors; moving her office and her transportation files, causing her
to be unable to locate necessary paperwork; and increasing the amount of work due under
the PIPs, knowing that Ms. Naeem would not be able to meet the deadlines.” The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the jury’s finding that such conduct was extreme
and outrageous was justified. Id.
110
At least one court has cited similar ideas concerning individual supervisor or coworker liability:
105
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The other justification sometimes offered for establishing such a strict
standard of extreme and outrageous conduct in workplace IIED cases is
simply that the workplace, by its nature, is stressful, so a high bar needs to
be set in order to prevent an overflow of claims of emotional distress.
Workplace stress may result from interaction with co-workers in the form of
“workplace gossip, rivalry, personality conflicts and the like,”111 all of
which could potentially lead to litigation if adequate limits are not placed on
the tort. More importantly, employers must make a host of decisions, and
employees must accept the reality that they will be
[S]ubject to routine employment-related conduct, including performance
evaluations, both formal and informal; decisions related to such
evaluations, such as those involving transfer, demotion, promotion and
compensation; similar decisions based on the employer's business needs
and desires, independent of the employee's performance; and
disciplinary or investigatory action arising from actual or alleged
employee misconduct.112
Another common idea in workplace IIED decisions, originally derived
from the Restatement but applied with special force in the workplace
setting, is that mere insults do not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct.113 As observed by one federal court, “[e]ven repeated
incidents of foul language and name-calling in the workplace have been
insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”114 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that it has
recognized “that the rough-and-tumble of daily business life
‘contemplate[s] a degree of teasing and taunting that in other circumstances
might be considered cruel and outrageous.’”115
It is noteworthy that where an employer’s conduct is unrelated to
[E]mployees who fear lawsuits by fellow employees may be less competitive with
each other, may promote the interest of their employer less vigorously, may refrain
from reporting the improper or even illegal conduct of fellow employees, may be
less frank in performance evaluations, and may make employment decisions such
as demotions, promotions and transfers on the basis of fear of suit rather than
business needs and desires. All this conduct would contribute to a less vigorous
and less productive workplace.
Perodeau v. Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 758 (Conn. 2002).
111
Id. at 769.
112
Id. at 768–69.
113
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
114
Gibbs v. Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp.3d 780, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
115
Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting W.
PAGE KEEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984 Supp. 1988)).
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traditional forms of employer decision making, there is more likely to be a
triable issue on the question of whether the conduct was extreme and
outrageous. For example, courts have found attempts by employers to
frame employees for theft116 or to make false accusations of theft while
threatening criminal prosecution to the rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct.117 Likewise, extreme forms of abuse or bullying on the
part of a manger having no relation to the workplace have sometimes
qualified.118 But assuming the wrongful conduct relates to more traditional
forms of managerial actions, a workplace IIED claim is unlikely to
succeed.119
C. The Failure of IIED Claims Based on Harassment and Retaliation as an
Example of the “Especially Strict Approach”
Employees sometimes bring IIED claims in lieu of or in addition to
traditional Title VII discrimination or harassment claims. At first glance, it
seems like these might be viable claims. Many of the markers of extreme
and outrageous conduct identified previously are present in these situations,
particularly in the case of sexual or race-based harassment.120 For example,
the harassment occurs within the context of the employer/employee
relationship, a relationship the law often treats as being special.121 There is
typically an abuse of authority when a supervisor harasses a subordinate.122
The harassment is also frequently repeated or prolonged and is of a
humiliating or degrading character.123 Harassment also does not involve an
exercise of employer discretion, so the arguments against allowing IIED
claims because they limit employer decision-making carry little weight.
Moreover, as this section discusses, the humiliation that a harassment
victim often experiences is a strong predictor of severe emotional
distress.124 Employees also sometimes bring IIED claims based on
116

Cf. Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 308 (5th Cir.1989).
Cf. Beavers v. Johnson, 145 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
118
See Livingston v. Marion Bank and Trust Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1324 (N.D.
Ala. 2014) (concluding triable issue existed where high-ranking employee used his position
to coerce employee into answering intimate questions concerning employee’s rape).
119
There are, of course, limitations on this principle as well. See Smithson v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 664 P.2d 1119, 1120–21 (Or. Ct. Ap. 1983) (concluding jury issue existed
where employer did not reasonably believe there was sufficient evidence to charge
employee with theft but nevertheless interrogated her for three hours and threatened her
with criminal prosecution if she did not sign a confession).
120
See supra notes 35–84 and accompanying text.
121
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
122
See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
123
See supra notes 64–77 and accompanying text.
124
See infra notes 144–162 and accompanying text.
117
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workplace retaliation. Once again, many of the same markers of extreme
and outrageous conduct would seem to be present in employment retaliation
situations. But as the following section discusses, employees have
generally had only limited success with IIED claims based on workplace
harassment and retaliation.
1. IIED Claims Involving Employment Discrimination and Harassment
IIED claims involving employment discrimination illustrate the
especially strict approach to workplace IIED claims. Outside of the
workplace setting, the fact that objectionable conduct is motivated by racial
animus, malice, or some other improper motive may be enough to create a
jury question on the issue of whether the objectionable conduct was extreme
and outrageous.125 In the employment setting, however, it is almost blackletter law that a discriminatory discharge, demotion, or other adverse action
does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.126 As one
federal court has explained, “[g]enerally, ordinary workplace disputes,
125

See supra notes 59–58 and accompanying text.
See Godfredson v. Hess, 173 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir.1999) (applying Ohio law)
(“[A]n employee's termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level
of ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ without proof of something more.”); Armijo v.
Yakima HMA, LLC, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (stating that
termination with a discriminatory motive cannot be enough to sustain an IIED claim);
Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Commc’ns of N.C., L.L.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (W.D.N.C.
2002) (“A termination, allegedly in violation of federal law alone, does not constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct . . . . Further, under North Carolina law, acts of
discrimination are not necessarily ‘extreme and outrageous.’”); Anzures v. La Canasta
Mexican Food Products Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 14-0250, 2015 WL 4504156, at *5 (Ariz. Ct.
App. July 23, 2015) (“La Canasta's termination of Anzures's employment does not ‘go
beyond all possible bounds of decency,’ even if it was motivated by retaliation.”); Cavico,
supra note 11, at 153 (“[M]ost courts appear very reluctant to automatically extend the tort
cause of action to a discrimination case.”); Chamallas, supra note 9, at 2127 (“For the most
part, courts do not equate discrimination with outrageous conduct.”). For specific
examples of this principle, see Hamilton v. School District of Columbia, 852 F. Supp. 2d
139, 153 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that allegation of racially-motivated transfer and false
allegations did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct); E.E.O.C. v. MTS
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1503, 1514 (D.N.M. 1996) (granting summary judgment to employer
where employee’s firing was allegedly disability-based); Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp.,
914 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (applying Mississippi law) (holding that a raciallymotivated demotion was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous); King v. Wiseway Super
Ctr., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding alleged gender-based
demotion and acts making it impossible for employee to do job were not extreme and
outrageous). In contrast, if an employer fires an employee and makes racist statements
while firing the employee, the manner of the firing—as opposed to the simple act of
firing—might be extreme and outrageous. Cf. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d
216, 217–19 (Cal. 1970).
126
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including . . . discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment
claims . . . do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct
necessary to support a claim of IIED.”127 In developing this approach, some
courts have expressed a general concern over permitting employees to
recharacterize discriminatory discharge claims as IIED claims.128 Indeed,
some courts have invoked the rule that where a plaintiff can seek a remedy
under another theory, an IIED claim is simply not available.129
The reluctance to recognize IIED claims in the workplace also extends
to claims beyond traditional discriminatory discharge. Harassment on the
basis of race, sex, or other characteristics likewise does not typically rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.130 As a result, IIED claims
based on employment discrimination typically fail even where, in the words
of one court, “a defendant or its employees engaged in highly reprehensible
conduct or otherwise intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional
distress.”131
For example, in one case, a supervisor referred to an African-American
employee as a monkey, sent a KKK-themed text with a depiction of a noose
to another employee, and used racial slurs (including the N-word) on an
almost daily basis.132 According to an Illinois federal court, this conduct
was not extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim.133 In
another decision from the same court, the court held as a matter of law that
the actions of a supervisor and co-workers, which included hanging a
pickaninny doll in the plaintiff’s office, subjecting the plaintiff to racial
slurs, and wrongfully placing the plaintiff on probation, was deplorable but
was not extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim.134 In a case
127

Ibraheem v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 196, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
See, e.g., Stevens v. New York, 691 F. Supp. 2d 392, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The
courts are wary of allowing plaintiffs to recharacterize claims for wrongful or abusive
discharge . . . as claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
129
See Louis v. Mobil Chemical Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that because plaintiff’s claims were covered by other statutory remedies, plaintiff
could not sue for IIED).
130
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131
DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1096 (M.D. Tenn.
2014). There are, of course, exceptions. For example, a supervisor’s racist taunts and
insults may sometimes (but not always) amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. See
Shamim v. Siemens Indus., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 496 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (dismissing
employee’s IIED claim based on supervisor’s offensive racial, religious, and ethnic slurs
directed at employee); Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916, 922 (Kan. 1982) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of employer where employee was subjected to a string of vulgar and
racist slurs).
132
Golden v. World Sec. Agency, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683–84 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
133
Id. at 697.
134
Briggs v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 914 F. Supp. 245, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1996). In
contrast, the supervisor’s alleged act of turning off the exhaust fan in the plaintiff’s lab so
128
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from Georgia, two co-workers allegedly referred to the plaintiff as a “f----t”
and a “sand n-----” on an everyday basis for almost a year, yet the appellate
court held as a matter of law that such conduct was not extreme and
outrageous.135
In some instances, the alleged conduct in question amounts to
discrimination in violation of Title VII but does amount to extreme and
outrageous conduct.136 For example, there are numerous cases in which
courts have found alleged hostile work environment sexual harassment to
be actionable under Title VII but not sufficiently egregious to amount to
extreme and outrageous conduct.137 Indeed, at least one court has held that
“as a general rule, sexual harassment alone does not rise to the level of
outrageousness necessary to make out a cause of action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”138 Instead, “Sexual harassment will only
support an outrageous conduct claim when the harassment alleged is
especially heinous compared to other sexual harassment claims.”139
that the plaintiff was exposed to toxic mercury fumes for eight hours could qualify as
extreme and outrageous. Id.
135
Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 723 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Reply Brief of
Appellant, Ghodatri v. Stearnes, 2011 WL 11538014, at *9–10. There are, of course,
situations in which courts have been willing to hold that discriminatory conduct may rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. See Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774
F.3d 140, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming jury verdict in favor of employee where
supervisor failed to address repeated forms of race-based harassment over the course of
three years and blocked others’ efforts to investigate harassment).
136
See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 628 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding triable
issue of fact existed concerning employee’s claim of racial harassment in violation of Title
VII but that conduct did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).
137
See, e.g., Cossairt v. Jarrett Builders, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 779, 786, 791 (M.D.
Tenn. 2018) (concluding that supervisor’s crude comments could form the basis for a
hostile work environment claim but did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct); Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“If
true, Piech states a claim for sexual harassment but not intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”); Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 755 (Pa. 1998) (finding hostile work
environment did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Chamallas, supra
note 126, at 2127 (“[C]ourts have refused to classify discrimination as per se outrageous
and have even hesitated to declare the “severe” or “pervasive” harassment required to
prove a Title VII claim of hostile environment sufficient to satisfy the threshold tort
requirement of ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct.”).
138
Hoy, 720 A.2d at 754. Title VII preempts federal employee IIED claims based
upon discrimination. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (holding
that Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in public
employment).
139
Cossairt v. Jarrett Builders, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 779, 790 (M.D. Tenn. 2018); see
also Cavico, supra note 11, at 156 (“Similar to the racial discrimination and harassment
cases, the courts typically hold that sexual harassment, even though violating Title VII,
does not necessarily equate to a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
Some victims of severe and pervasive harassment have been able to raise a triable issue on
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The fact that harassing conduct may be actionable under Title VII but
not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct is noteworthy given the
demanding standard that Title VII caselaw imposes. To amount to illegal
harassment resulting in a hostile work environment under Title VII, the
conduct must, by definition, be severe or pervasive.140 This inquiry focuses
on, among other things, whether the conduct occurred repeatedly or over a
prolonged period of time.141 The fact that the nature of the conduct was
severe or occurred repeatedly or over a prolonged period would both be
factors tending to at least raise a jury question on the issue of whether the
conduct was extreme and outrageous. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
specifically stated that to be actionable under Title VII, the conduct in
question must be “extreme.”142 Despite this, several courts have stated that
the fact that harassment was severe or pervasive under Title VII is
insufficient to raise a jury question as to the extreme and outrageous nature
of such conduct for purposes of an IIED claim.143 Of course, if
discriminatory or harassing conduct is not actionable under Title VII, the
conduct, almost by definition, is not extreme and outrageous for purposes of
an IIED claim.
The fact that discriminatory or harassing behavior typically does not rise
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct is perhaps particularly
surprising in light of its potential to cause severe emotional distress. As
others have noted, employment discrimination—and harassment in
particular—is especially likely to result in emotional distress.144 One
the issue of the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., Ibraheem v.
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 196, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (recognizing potential
viability of such a claim where harassment involves battery); Greenhorn v. Marriott
International, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (stating supervisor’s
exposure of himself and other conduct could amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).
140
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
141
See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding
sufficient evidence existed to support finding of severe or pervasive harassment where
conduct was repeated and prolonged).
142
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
143
See Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
144
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 718 (noting that sexual or religious
discrimination often produces emotional distress); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133, 137 (1982) (discussing the psychological harms of racial stigmatization); Brianne J.
Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1513 (2007) (noting the psychological harms suffered by victims
of sexual harassment); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making
Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 518 (2006) (“[I]t is
well-established that race- or sex-based decisionmaking can cause stigmatic or dignitary
harm to the employee who was the subject of that decision.”); Frank S. Ravitch, Complicity
and Discrimination, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 525 n. 237 (2019) (“Numerous studies
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common consequence of workplace discrimination and harassment is the
accompanying sense of humiliation that victims experience.145 The essence
of humiliation is the feeling that one has been unjustly degraded or lowered
by one with greater power.146 It is this feeling of having been wronged by
one in a position of power that drives many of the negative consequences
associated with humiliation.147 Humiliation involves not only a sense of
unfairness, but a feeling of powerlessness.148 These feelings of disrespect
and unfairness may impact an individual’s sense of esteem and claims of
status.149 As researchers have noted, each of us makes claims of status: “I
am a good parent;” “I am a good employee;” “I am a good student;” “I am a
valued member of this community.”150 An act of humiliation degrades
these sorts of status claims.151 And where the degradation is public, the
effect is to deny the victim the voice to make status claims within the
relevant community and to deprive the victim of the “very ability to behave
as members of their communities” due to this degraded status.152 In this
way, humiliation amounts to an attack on the dignity of another; to
have shown the psychological harm that discrimination can cause for gays and lesbians.”);
Devon Sherrell, Comment, “A Fresh Look”: Title VII’s New Promise for LGBT Protection
Post-Hively, 68 EMORY L.J. 1101, 1104 (2019) (noting higher rates of depression among
LGBT victims of employment discrimination).
145
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 718 (“Victims of intentional sexual or religious
discrimination in employment terms and conditions often endure terrible humiliation, pain
and suffering.”); Neil Altman, Humiliation, Retaliation, and Violence, 19 TIKKUN 16, 16
(2004) (noting that humiliation is closely linked with retaliation in the psychological
literature); Delgado, supra note 144, at 137 (noting that the psychological responses to
racial stigmatization include humiliation); Gorod, supra note 144, at 1513 (noting the
humiliation that may accompany sexual harassment); Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative
Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF.
L. REV. 85, 124 n. 143 (1986) (“The humiliation, embarrassment and psychological harm
that can be caused by discrimination is particularly severe and well-established.”).
146
See Trumbull, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 643; see also Phil
Leask, Losing Trust in the World: Humiliation and its Consequences, 19 PSYCHODYN
PRACT. 129, 131 (2013) (stating power is central to humiliation),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14753634.2013.778485?needAccess=true.
147
See generally Leask, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 131 (stating
“humiliation is a demonstrative exercise of power”).
148
See McCauley, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 257 (stating that
humiliation “involves being placed in a lowly, debased, and powerless position by someone
who has, at that moment, greater power than oneself”).
149
See Burton, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“In short, humiliation is the
public failure of one’s status claims.”); Trumbull, infra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 647 (stating that “disrespect endangers esteem and status”).
150
See Burton supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Torres & Bergner, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 197.
151
See Torres & Bergner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 197.
152
Torres & Bergner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 199.
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humiliate an individual is to rob that individual of his or her dignity.153
The research in the field suggests that humiliation may lead to any
number of long-lasting negative consequences, some of them quite
substantial.154 Victims of humiliation are likely to experience anger and a
desire for revenge and to punish the perpetrator for the injustice.155 The
victim who does not retaliate may perceive this failure as a shortcoming,
which can lead to feelings of shame.156 Numerous studies show that beyond
these sorts of readily predictable consequences, humiliation “may be a
substantial contribution in the genesis of depression [and] character
pathology.”157 According to one review, “[s]uffering severe humiliation has
been shown empirically to plunge individuals into major depressions,
suicidal states, and severe anxiety states, including ones characteristic of
posttraumatic stress disorder.”158 Factors that may contribute to the severity
of the humiliation include how public the humiliation was, how core to the
individual’s way of life the community in which the humiliation occurred
was, to what degree the individual was effectively silenced or marginalized,
and whether the humiliation was carried out with malicious intent.159
The fact that humiliation occurs in the workplace may be a particularly
important factor in the severity of emotional harm an individual suffers.
The workplace is where many individuals derive a strong sense of identity
and status.160 For many people, the workplace provides a particularly

153

See Doron Shultziner & Itai Rabinovici, Human Dignity, Self-Worth and
Humiliation: A Comparative Legal-Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y,
AND L. 105, 111 2012 (“Violations of dignity in terms of the thin meaning are usually acts
that
humiliate.”),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228322601_Human_Dignity_SelfWorth_and_Humiliation_A_Comparative_Legal-Psychological_Approach;
Daniel
Statman, Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect, 13 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 523, 523 (2000) (“[I]n
humiliation, one is ‘stripped of one’s dignity,’ one is ‘robbed of” dignity, or simply ‘loses’
it.”)
(citations
omitted),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247516323_Humiliation_dignity_and_selfrespect.
154
See Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview, 12 J. PRIMARY
PREVENTION 93, 105 (1991) (“Humiliation has been “implicated—directly or indirectly—
in many, if not most, clinically[-]recognized emotional and social disorders.”); Leask, infra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 129.
155
See Leask, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 136; McCauley, infra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 259.
156
See McCauley, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 263.
157
Trumbull, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 655.
158
Torres & Bergner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 199.
159
Torres & Bergner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 200.
160
See Fisk, infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 80–81 (noting that work is
where many find a sense of significance and identity).
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strong sense of community.161 Therefore, in the words of one author,
“[h]umiliation at work can be an especially toxic phenomenon.”162
2. IIED Cases Involving Retaliation
Courts generally take a similar approach to IIED claims based on
employment retaliation. Workplace retaliation may take a variety of forms.
The most obvious forms are “ultimate employment actions,” such as
discharge, demotion, denial of promotion, or pay decrease.163 But there are
other forms of retaliation, such as undesirable transfers, changes in job
duties, written reprimands and warnings,164 schedule changes,165 physically
isolating an employee from co-workers,166 excessive criticism or public
ridicule,167 and ostracizing or instructing subordinates to ostracize the
employee who engages in protected activity.168
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes prohibit employers from
retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination or
participate in a proceeding involving such discrimination.169 The retaliation
need not result in discharge in order to be actionable. Instead, where an
employee engages in this sort of protected conduct, employer retaliation is
actionable where it is “materially adverse,” that is where it might well
dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected conduct.170
Federal courts differ dramatically in terms of their application of this
standard, with some courts adopting a strict approach as to what sorts of
action might deter an individual from engaging in protected activity and
others adopting a more context-specific approach.171
161

See Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 608
(2017) (noting the critical role that coworkers play in our lives).
162
Fisk infra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 80.
163
See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). At least one
court has suggested that placing an employee on leave is an ultimate employment action.
Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014).
164
See Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).
165
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEV. L.J. 823,
832 (2019) (listing cases); Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67
FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2036 (2015) (same).
166
See Olonovich v. FMR-LLC Fidelity Invs., CIV No. 15-599 SCY/WPL, 2016 WL
9777193, at *7 (D.N.M. June 21, 2016).
167
See Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F. App'x 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010).
168
See Olonovich, 2016 WL 9777193, at *2.
169
See id. at *2; Clay v. Lafarge N. Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1030 (S.D. Iowa
2013).
170
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
171
See Sperino, supra note 165, at 2035 (noting the strict approach taken by some
courts).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813251

26-Mar-21]

DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION & IIED

27

Plaintiffs sometimes bring IIED claims in addition to or in place of a
statutory retaliation claim. One of the earliest workplace IIED cases
involving alleged employer retaliation was Harrison v. Loyal Protective
Life Ins. Co.,172 a 1979 case from Massachusetts. In Harrison, an employer
was aware that an employee had terminal cancer and was unable to continue
working. Despite this, the employee’s supervisor threatened the employee,
saying that if he filed for physical disability benefits, he would not be able
to return to his job when he regained his health.173 Thus, the supervisor
threatened to retaliate against the employee if the employee exercised his
right to claim disability benefits. The complaint alleged that the employer
allowed and was aware of the supervisor’s threat.174 With little discussion,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council held that the employee had
stated a cause of action for IIED against the employer.175
But the Harrison decision is an outlier today. Instead, as is the case
with IIED claims based on discriminatory or harassing conduct, it is the
unusual case in which retaliation creates a jury question on the issue of
extreme and outrageous conduct, even where the retaliation is unlawful by
statute.176 For example, in one case, an employee was allegedly called a
“bitch” and reassigned to an isolated work location with no windows or fans
and that contained bats, rats, raccoons, and other animals (that she had to
clean up after) for asserting her rights under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA).177 Being reassigned to this location was viewed by
employees as a punishment.178 Despite this, the court held as a matter of
law that the employer’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous.179
172

396 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1979).
Id. at 988.
174
Id. at 992.
175
Id. at 992.
176
See, e.g., Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (“Even if an
employer has a ‘retaliatory motive’ in terminating an employee, this conduct is not extreme
and outrageous as a matter of law.”); McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn., 216 Cal.App.4th
283, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding fact that defendant’s conduct may have
amounted to unlawful retaliation did not mean that the conduct rose to the “extreme and
outrageous” standard); Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Companies v. Sears, 54 S.W.3d 361, 374
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“An employee's firing, even if wrongful, e.g., in retaliation, alone
does not constitute legally sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct.”);
Janken v. GM Hughes Elec., 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“A simple
pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.”).
177
Gibbs v. Voith Indus. Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 780, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
178
Id. at 788.
179
Id. at 802. Courts are sometimes willing to recognize a tort claim based on
employment retaliation, although the tort in question is not IIED. The tort of retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy also limits the ability of an employer to retaliate
against an employee who engages in some form of protected activity that public policy
173
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Courts typically take a similar approach when the retaliation is triggered
by an employee’s opposition to harassment. Rather than treating the
underlying harassment and eventual retaliation together as part of a pattern
of wrongful conduct when considering the “extreme and outrageous
conduct” element, courts frequently consider the wrongful acts in
isolation.180 The result is often that neither the harassment nor the ensuing
retaliation rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.181
III. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF IIED CLAIMS IN ADDRESSING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT

Workplace IIED claims are not the only situation in which courts take a
restrictive approach to employee claims. Restrictive decisions under Title
VII limit the reach of the statute and its effectiveness in addressing
discrimination—most notably, harassment—and retaliation. As a result,
there are various gaps in Title VII’s coverage when it comes to harassment
and retaliation. As discussed in this Part, there are some states that
recognize that retaliation in response to opposition to discrimination or
harassment may rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. In
such situations, it is possible that IIED claims might help fill some of the
gaps that currently exist in employment discrimination law.
1. Gaps in Title VII Harassment Law that Limit Remedies Afforded to
Plaintiffs
As interpreted by courts, Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision
contains various gaps. One obvious example is the fact that Title VII does
encourages. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
Thus, the employee who refuses to commit an unlawful act, fulfills an important public
obligation (e.g., jury duty), exercises a statutory right to benefits, refuses to waive a nonwaivable right, engages in whistleblowing activities, or otherwise engages in other activity
directly furthering a well-established public policy and is discharged because of such action
may have a tort claim against an employer. Id. § 5.02. A few jurisdictions also recognize
the tort of retaliatory discipline in violation of public policy, which prohibits an employer
from engaging in other forms of retaliation short of discharge because an employee has
engaged in protected activity. Id. § 5.01 cmt. a. But these types of employer acts, which
lie at the core of the employment-at-will rule, generally do not rise to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct according to courts.
180
Cf. Thomas v. Habitat Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating that if
a jury believed that employer’s conduct was in retaliation for complaints of sexual
harassment, “the entire course of conduct” could be considered extreme and outrageous).
181
See Daniels v. C.L. Frates & Co., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (W.D. Okla. 2009)
(dismissing IIED claim based on creation of hostile work environment and retaliation).
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not cover workplaces with fewer than 15 employees.182 Another example is
the fact that there is no individual liability under Title VII for
discriminatory or retaliatory conduct.183 And as the law has developed,
employer liability for the harassment committed by employees is limited. If
the harassing employee is merely a co-worker, the employer is only liable
where the employer “knew or should have known about the harassment and
failed to take effective action to stop it.”184 Under the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton185 and Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth,186 employers are only vicariously liable under Title VII for
the harassing conduct of an employee when the employee has the authority
to take tangible employment actions against the employee, such as hiring or
firing.187 Moreover, employers are afforded an affirmative defense in the
case of harassment by a supervisor that frequently enables them to avoid
liability except where the harassment results in a tangible employment.188
Under this defense, an employer can avoid liability if the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent, and correct promptly, any harassing
behavior and the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.189 The most obvious way in which an employer can
satisfy its burden under this defense is by developing a policy that allows
for the internal reporting and investigation of allegations of harassment.
But the Farragher/Ellerth affirmative defense also led to an increased focus
on the use of employer-sponsored anti-harassment training for
employees.190 Indeed, the Supreme Court was explicit in its belief that the
creation of a reporting procedure might encourage employees to complain
before the harassing conduct became severe or pervasive and, therefore,
became actionable under Title VII.191
The reality has proven somewhat disappointing. While anti-harassment
training is common, there are questions concerning how effective such
training is.192 And the Court’s affirmative defense has created its own odd
182
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”).
183
See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993).
184
Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015).
185
524 U. S. 775 (1998).
186
524 U. S. 742 (1998).
187
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
188
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
189
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
190
See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 5, at 67 (noting EEOC guidance following Ellerth that
employers develop anti-harassment training).
191
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
192
See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 5, at 68 (questioning the effectiveness of such
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gap in coverage. The defense effectively requires employees to come
forward promptly with complaints of harassment; the Court itself has
suggested that employees may end up raising concerns before the
harassment becomes severe or pervasive. But as the caselaw has developed,
an employer is only prohibited from retaliating against an employee who
complains about possible harassment if the employee has a reasonable
belief that the harassment is unlawful. 193 Title VII’s “severe or pervasive”
standard for what qualifies as actionable harassment is notoriously difficult
to satisfy.194 And many federal courts have adopted an exceptionally strict
view of what qualifies as a “reasonable” belief.195 The determination as to
what qualifies as a reasonable belief as to the illegal nature of employer
conduct is largely determined by reference to Title VII caselaw on the
subject of discrimination.196 Aside from being complex, Title VII
jurisprudence establishes a high bar for plaintiffs attempting to establish
intentional discrimination.197 As a result, employees who may have been
retaliated against for raising concerns about possible discrimination may be
denied a remedy because they fail to understand the complexities of federal
discrimination law, such as the rule that a supervisor’s use or toleration of
“stray” racial slurs in the workplace does not violate Title VII.198
This potentially places an employee in a Catch-22: if the employee
reports before the conduct approaches the demanding “severe or pervasive”
level, the employee may lack a reasonable belief that the conduct was
actually unlawful. If the employee waits until ongoing harassment reaches
this level, the employee may be deemed to have unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the employer’s policy and be unable to proceed on a
harassment claim.
training).
193
See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
194
See, e.g., Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2014)
(referring to the standard as a demanding one).
195
See Matthew W. Green, Jr., What's So Reasonable About Reasonableness?
Rejecting a Case-Law Centered Approach to Title VII's Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U.
KAN L. REV. 759, 794 (2014).
196
See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016).
197
See Charlotte S. Alexander et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers of
the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2016) (noting the difficulties in proof
Title VII plaintiffs face in light of court decisions); Green, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 771–72 (noting the complexity of the law in the area).
198
This is the so-called “stray remarks doctrine.” See Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398,
402 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[A] slur is not in and of itself proof of actionable discrimination.”);
Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 540 (2018) (“The basic idea
behind this doctrine is that alleged discriminatory remarks that happen in a casual setting
outside discussions regarding the dismissal decision do not support an inference of
discrimination.”).
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The gap created by the odd interaction of the strict “severe or pervasive”
standard, the strict interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,
and Ellerth/Farragher’s affirmative defense illustrates how essential it is
for the anti-discrimination goal of Title VII that employees have adequate
protection from retaliation. One of the more distressing aspects of the
retaliation decisions is the fact that the limited protection afforded to
victims of retaliation increases the likelihood that discrimination and
harassment within the workplace will continue to thrive. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, retaliation or the threat of retaliation may have a
strong deterrent effect on those who would raise concerns about the
organization’s actions and treatment of others.199 The evidence suggests
that those who have less status in the workplace are more likely to be
deterred from raising concerns about that structure or its abuses.200 This
tendency for the threat of retaliation to deter the most vulnerable of
employees from opposing workplace discrimination necessarily impacts the
ability of Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes to effectively
address workplace discrimination. As the Supreme Court has noted, antidiscrimination statutes depend in no small measure on the willingness of coworkers to come forward with concerns over discrimination and harassment
and to participate in proceedings designed to remedy such conduct.201 In
order to encourage employees to engage in such protected activities, antidiscrimination statutes contain anti-retaliation provisions designed to
provide protection for those employees who do so. Weak legal protection
from retaliation makes it more likely that workplace discrimination and
harassment will go unaddressed.
Building upon this idea, Professor Nicole Buonocore Porter has argued
that in order to address workplace harassment, one must first address
workplace retaliation.202 Porter points to studies revealing that victims of
sexual harassment, for example, frequently fail to report harassment for fear
of retaliation, including ostracism by co-workers.203 Therefore, Porter
argues, “[i]f we hope to increase the reporting rates of victims of
harassment, we must at a minimum protect those employees who
experience retaliation after reporting harassment.”204
Yet, the retaliation law that has developed under Title VII has its own
199

See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006).
See Brake, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 39–40 (noting that “the
fear of retaliation is especially chilling and all the more effective in silencing” the
opposition of those with less power in the workplace).
201
See White, 548 U.S. at 67 (“Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the
cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.”).
202
See Porter, supra note 18, at 50.
203
See Porter, supra note 18, at 51.
204
Porter, supra note 18, at 56.
200
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set of gaps. As mentioned, to be protected from retaliation, an employee
must have suffered a “materially adverse” action in response to protected
activity.205 Some courts have adopted a strict view of what qualifies as a
materially adverse act of retaliation for purposes of a Title VII claim.206 For
example, some courts have adopted the position that a written reprimand or
warning without any tangible consequences—even when the reprimand is
undeserved—is not retaliation that might dissuade a reasonable employee
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.207 Some courts have
similarly adopted the bright-line rule that unfulfilled threats of termination
do not meet the material adversity standard, nor does placing an employee
on disciplinary or administrative leave.208 Others improperly import the
rule developed in discrimination cases that a transfer that does not involve a
demotion in form or substance cannot rise to the level of a materially
adverse action.209 Even when not adopting these sorts of bright-line rules,
205

See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
207
See Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming
summary judgment for employer); Emami v. Bolden, 241 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (E.D. Va.
2017) (stating that a negative performance review, standing alone, does not constitute a
materially adverse action); Porter, supra note 165, at 831 (citing cases in which “discipline,
reprimands, and negative evaluations [are not considered] ‘materially adverse’”). But see
Hallmon v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D. Colo. 2013) (stating
that repeated threats to issue a written warning, even if not acted upon, may qualify as
materially adverse).
208
See Porter, supra note 165, at 832 (same); Sperino, supra note 165, at 2036 (listing
cases); see also Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App'x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mere
threat of termination does not constitute an adverse employment action.”); Brown v. SDH
Educ. E. LLC, No. 312-cv-2961-TLW, 2014 WL 468974, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (“An
Unrealized Threat of Termination Is Not an Adverse Action”); McKneely v. Zachary
Police Dep't, No. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL 4585160, at *10–11 (M.D. La. Aug. 28,
2013) (holding in favor of employer where employee was on disciplinary leave for thirty
days pending an investigation and stating that investigations do not amount to adverse
actions).
209
See Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York, 17cv8024, 2019 WL 652593, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019); Hair v. Fayette Cty. of Pa., 265 F. Supp. 3d 544, 568 (W.D. Pa.
2017). Courts have adopted similarly strict bright-line rules in other situations. See
Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 452 Fed. Appx. 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Butler v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 473, 496 (M.D. La. 2012) (stating that supervisor chastisement does
not rise to the level of material adversity). And many courts have articulated a similar rule
that “ostracism by co-workers do[es] not rise to the level of material adversity but instead
fall[s] into the category of ‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners.’” Butler, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (quoting Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 586
F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also Porter, supra note 165, at 832 (stating “courts
almost uniformly hold that ‘shunning,’ ‘ostracizing,’ and being harassed does not rise to
the level of an adverse employment action”). There are, of course, courts that take a more
context-specific approach in these situations. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that retaliatory ostracism by co-workers may rise to the level of a
206

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813251

26-Mar-21]

DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION & IIED

33

some court adopt a narrow view of what might be likely to deter a
reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity, such as the
decisions in which supervisors have physically isolated the offending
employee from co-workers and instructed co-workers not to speak to the
employee210 or in which supervisors have allegedly berated employees on a
daily basis or in front of co-workers in retaliation for engaging in protected
activity.211
2. IIED Claims as a Means of Addressing Discrimination and Harassment
One way to encourage the reporting of harassment would be to amend
Title VII and other statutes to provide greater protection from retaliation.212
Indeed, comprehensive reform of employment discrimination laws at the
state and federal level might go a long way in the fight against employment
discrimination and harassment. Still, a less ambitious, but nonetheless
helpful, approach might be to let IIED claims lend a hand.
Even under the most conservative conceptions of the proper role of
IIED claims, these are situations in which IIED claims might potentially fill
a gap in existing law and provide a remedy. If courts were willing to
materially adverse action if it is sufficiently severe, and the employer ordered it or knew
about it and failed to properly respond. Baker v. Henderson, No. 99-2660, 2000 WL
767846, at *7 (7th Cir. June 12, 2000).
210
See Martinez v. City of Birmingham, Case No. 2:18-cv-0465-JEO, 2018 WL
5013861, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 16, 2018) (dismissing retaliation claim where employee
was isolated from other employees); Olonovich v. FMR-LLC Fidelity Investments, CIV
No. 15-599 SCY/WPL, 2016 WL 9777193, at *7 (D.N.M. June 21, 2016) (holding that
supervisor’s act of directing co-workers to not speak to plaintiff and isolating plaintiff by
moving her desk was insufficient to establish actionable retaliation); Cruz v. New York
State Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision, No. 13 Civ. 1335(AJN), 2014 WL
2547541, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2014) (dismissing retaliation claim on the grounds that
supervisor’s act of isolating plaintiff from coworkers was not “more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience”); Slaughter v. College of the Mainland, Civil Action No. G-12-018, 2016
WL 4771030, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2012) (holding that supervisor’s acts of isolating
plaintiff from meetings, information, and other personnel and instructing co-workers did
not rise to the level of material adversity). But see Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot
Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir.1999) (holding instructing “the other employees not to
talk to [plaintiff], go into his area or otherwise interact with him” constituted actionable
retaliation).
211
See Ghiles v. City of Chi. Heights, No. 12 CV 7634, 2018 WL 1377909, at *4–5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2018); Booth v. Cty. Exec., 186 F. Supp. 3d 479, 488 (D. Md. 2016)
(stating that supervisor’s act of verbally embarrassing plaintiff in front of coworkers did
not rise to the level of material adversity). But see Mazur v. Sw. Veterans Ctr., CV17-826,
2018 WL 3957410, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2018) (denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss where supervisor, inter alia, regularly berated plaintiff in front of other
employees).
212
See Porter, supra note 18, at 56.
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recognize IIED claims premised on retaliation for having opposed unlawful
discrimination or harassment, the tort might potentially serve as an
additional tool in the fight against discrimination and harassment.
While courts generally do not view employment retaliation as extreme
and outrageous conduct, a few courts view retaliation that occurs as part of
course of conduct involving discriminatory or harassing behavior as
conduct of a special character. In Pennsylvania, where the general rule is
that hostile work environment sexual harassment, standing alone, does not
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, harassment combined with
retaliatory employer behavior may qualify.213 Thus, the employee who is a
victim of both harassment and retaliation may state a claim. In Hoy v.
Angelone, a 1998 Pennsylvania decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained that “[r]etaliatory conduct is typically indicative of discrimination
of a more severe nature and usually has a greater detrimental impact upon
the victim.”214 Thus, “retaliation is a critical and prominent factor in
assessing the outrageousness of an employer's conduct.”215
Under this approach, it is the rare case in which workplace harassment,
standing alone, can amount to the extreme and outrageous conduct
necessary to support an IIED claim.216
But when harassment is
accompanied by retaliation, courts applying Pennsylvania law have
sometimes been willing to classify conduct as extreme and outrageous.217
213

Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998).
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
See Hare v. H&R Indus., Inc., 67 Fed. App’x. 114, 121, 2003 WL 21197050, at *5
(3d Cir. May 22, 2003) (affirming IIED verdict in favor of plaintiff where supervisors
acquiesced in and were responsible for harassment and ultimately terminated employee’s
employment in retaliation for her complaints); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390,
395–96 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he only instances in which courts applying Pennsylvania law
have found conduct outrageous in the employment context is where an employer engaged
in both sexual harassment and other retaliatory behavior against an employee.”);
Frankhouser v. Clearfield Cty. Career and Tech. Ctr., Case No. 3:18-cv-180, 2019 WL
1259570, at *17 (W.D. Pa. March 19, 2019) (“[F]or allegations of sexual harassment to rise
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, courts have often required both sexual
harassment and retaliation against the harassed employee.”); Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter
Co., 677 F. Supp. 307, 310–11 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that employer retaliation
stemming from employee’s rejection of sexual advances may qualify as extreme and
outrageous conduct). In one odd case, a federal court held that an employee who had been
the victim of sexual harassment could not state an IIED claim when she reported the
harassment to management and was retaliated against in the form of increased harassment.
See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., No. 3:09-CV-0042, 2009 WL 2579308, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2019). According to the court, this type of retaliation was not extensive
enough to qualify as extreme and outrageous, even when considered in conjunction with
the other harassment the plaintiff endured. See id. In another decision that is difficult to
214

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813251

26-Mar-21]

DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION & IIED

35

For example, in Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter, an employee turned down the
alleged repeated sexual advances of a supervisor.218 In response, the
supervisor assigned the employee “burdensome tasks, withheld information
from her which was necessary in her job, created an oppressive work
environment, and followed her throughout defendant's plant.”219 In
addition, he allegedly threatened the employee with suspension if she
complained about his harassment and gave her a less-than-satisfactory
performance evaluation.220 The alleged retaliatory harassment was severe
enough that the employee eventually resigned.221 Under the standard
approach in workplace IIED cases, neither the harassment nor the
retaliation, standing alone, would have been sufficient to sustain a finding
of extreme and outrageous conduct.222 But when considered together, the
conduct, as alleged, was sufficiently outrageous to survive the defendants’
motion to dismiss.223 Thus, in the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, retaliation is a “weighty factor” among “a number of factors used in
assessing” an IIED claim.224
It is noteworthy that courts applying Pennsylvania law have not required
that either the harassment or the retaliation meet the statutory definitions of
actionable conduct under Title VII. Instead, what appears to be more
relevant is the fact that the conduct is serious and of a harassing and
retaliatory nature.225 In a few instances, courts in other jurisdictions have
comprehend, a federal court ruled that an employee who was retaliated against for filing a
charge of sexual harassment could not state an IIED claim because she was retaliated
against for filing the charge, not for rejecting the supervisor’s sexual advances. See Van
Horn v. Elbeco Incorporates, No. CIV.A. 94-2720, 1996 WL 385630, at *16 (E.D. Pa. July
10, 1996).
218
Bowersox, 677 F. Supp. at 308.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
See Armijo v. Yakima HMA, LLC, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (E.D. Wash. 2012)
(“[T]ermination with a discriminatory or retaliatory motive cannot be enough to support
this tort.”); Daniels v. C.L. Frates and Co., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (W.D. Okla. 2009)
(“Oklahoma courts . . . have routinely held that workplace harassment claims do not rise to
the level of outrageous conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.”); Bowersox, 677 F. Supp. at 311 (stating if the only allegations
involved sexual harassment, the employee’s claim would have failed).
223
Bowersox, 677 F. Supp. at 312. Employees in other jurisdictions have raised
similar arguments. In Satterfield v. Karnes, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1171 (E.D. Ohio 2010),
the employee alleged sexual harassment and also alleged that the employer’s retaliation for
complaining
about
the
harassment
was
“especially outrageous.” The claim failed, however, in part because there was insufficient
proof of retaliation to begin with. See id. at 1170, 1171.
224
Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998).
225
For example, in E.E.O.C. v. Federal Express Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 700 (M.D. Pa.
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likewise been receptive to the idea that employer retaliation stemming from
a complaint of sexual harassment may rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct.226
Illinois courts have adopted a similar approach, although one not as
confined to instances of harassment. In Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago,227 an employee disclosed illegal banking practices to auditors.
His supervisors then allegedly engaged in a pattern of ongoing retaliatory
conduct, of which the employer was aware, that continued even after the
employee notified supervisors that his physical and mental health were
suffering as a result of their actions.228 The Illinois Court of Appeals held
that the employer’s conduct, “though not extreme and outrageous per se,
became so by its retaliatory and punitive nature.”229 Numerous subsequent
Illinois and federal decisions applying Illinois law have cited Johnson for
the proposition that the fact that an employer engaged in retaliatory acts in
2005), an employee “was regularly subjected to rude and offensive language and displays
of physical vulgarity motivated by sex.” Id. at 713–14. After the employee complained to
management, “co-workers refused to load her truck, refused to speak with her, assaulted
her with heavy freight, and sabotaged her truck.” Id. at 714. There was also evidence that
the employer failed to adequately respond to this co-worker retaliation. Id. According to
the court, there was sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct to survive a
summary judgment motion. Id. It is not clear, however, that the harassment the employee
endured was severe or pervasive enough to qualify as actionable sex discrimination,
whether the co-worker harassment was severe enough to qualify as actionable retaliation
under Title VII, or whether the employer could he held liable for its failure to put a stop to
co-worker retaliation. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006) (citing source observing that courts have held that “‘snubbing’ by supervisors and
co-workers” is not actionable); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding employer may only be liable for co-worker retaliation where
supervisors or members of management have actual or constructive knowledge of the coworker’s retaliatory behavior and responded to the plaintiff’s complaints so inadequately
that the response manifests indifference or unreasonableness under the circumstances).
226
See Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying
Arkansas law and concluding employee stated a claim where she refused supervisor’s
sexual advances and then employer made false representations while contesting employee’s
unemployment benefit claims); Schwartz v. Bay Industries, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1041
(E.D. Wis. 2003) (applying Wisconsin law and holding that plaintiff stated a claim where
supervisor allegedly retaliated against employee after she refused supervisor’s sexual
advances); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wyo. 1997) (identifying retaliation for
refusing or reporting sexual harassment as a factor that may aid in the determination);
Retherford v. AT & T Comm’ns of Mountain States, 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992)
(concluding plaintiff had stated a claim where defendants “shadowed her movements,
intimidated her with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at her
work in ways that made her job markedly more stressful, all in retaliation for her good-faith
complaint of sexual harassment”).
227
557 N.E.2d 328 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
228
Id. at 330–31.
229
Id. at 331.
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response to an employee’s protected activities is a factor to consider in
deciding whether conduct is extreme and outrageous.230 In addition to
situations like Johnson where an employee “blows the whistle” on unlawful
conduct, some courts applying Illinois law have classified employer
retaliation as extreme and outrageous where employees have refused to
engage in unlawful conduct or have engaged in activity protected by Title
VII.231 Other courts have sometimes been willing to recognize IIED claims
in similar situations involving retaliation resulting from opposition to
discrimination or other forms of protected activity.232
Importantly, these decisions treat retaliation and the underlying
harassment or other wrongful conduct as part of a pattern of connected
wrongful conduct.233 Rather than treating the harassment and ensuing
retaliation as discrete acts, neither of which, standing alone, might rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, this approach views the
defendant’s behavior as inextricably linked. The effect of treating
retaliation—in the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—as a
“weighty” factor in workplace IIED cases234 may be to transform employer
acts that might otherwise be classified as trivial into extreme and outrageous
conduct. For example, the whistleblowing employee in Johnson was
subjected to threats of termination, given an excessive work load, denied
230

See Shamin v. Siemens, 854 F. Supp. 2d 496, 512 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“As a rule,
courts have found an employer's actions “extreme and outrageous” when an employee
experiences retaliation from her employer soon after refusing (or resisting) the employer's
instructions to violate a law.”); Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858,
867–68 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“When an employer's conduct is both coercive and retaliatory,
courts have generally found the conduct to be extreme and outrageous, constituting a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.).
231
See Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill.1993)
(holding employee stated IIED claim based on retaliation for filing an internal complaint of
sexual harassment); Swider v. Yeutter, 762 F. Supp. 225, 227 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (concluding
employee stated IIED cause of action where she alleged retaliation for having filed a sex
discrimination claim); Milton v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 427 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981)
(finding extreme and outrageous conduct where employee refused to falsify work reports in
violation of law and was retaliated against by, inter alia, giving employee less desirable
work assignments).
232
See Hurst v. St. George Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., No. 08-CV-2182, 2009 WL
1363408, at *4 (C.D. Ill. May 13, 2009) (concluding plaintiff stated an IIED claim where
employer allegedly threatened to terminate and did ultimately terminate employee who
refused to support employer’s untrue statements); Walters v. Rubicon, Inc., 706 So.2d 503,
507–08 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding plaintiff stated IIED claim where employer allegedly
retaliated against employee who reported violations of law to employer).
233
See Class v. N.J. Life Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 776, 778. (N.D. Ill. 1990) (concluding
that acts of sexual harassment were not extreme and outrageous but ensuing retaliation was
part of a pattern of wrongful conduct and was actionable).
234
Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 755 (Pa. 1998).
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opportunities for advancement, had the quality of his work undervalued,
was given poor performance reviews, and had his instructions to his direct
subordinates undercut.235 Absent the employer’s retaliatory motive, this
conduct would have been unlikely to qualify as extreme and outrageous
based on the general approach to workplace IIED claims.236 But according
to the Johnson court, the defendant’s conduct, “though not extreme and
outrageous per se, became so by its retaliatory and punitive nature.237
IV. RECOGNIZING THE DETRIMENTAL IMPACT THAT RETALIATION AND
HARASSMENT HAVE ON VICTIMS AND THE SEVERE NATURE OF SUCH CONDUCT

Revenge, at first though sweet,
Bitter ere long back on itself recoils.
- John Milton238
If courts are to adopt the approach to IIED claims involving retaliation
for having opposed discrimination or harassment described in this Article,
plaintiffs will need to offer a sufficient justification to overcome the
longstanding tendency of courts to apply the “especially strict approach” to
workplace IIED claims. The justification for treating retaliation stemming
from opposition to workplace discrimination or harassment as a special kind
of wrong that may support an IIED claim is that such conduct is more
severe or egregious in nature than other forms of workplace misconduct and
is likely to have a greater detrimental impact upon victims.239 The
following Part anticipates the challenge to this assertion. Does retaliation—
at least when combined with discrimination or harassment—really have a
greater impact on victims than other forms of conduct? And is such
conduct truly more severe in nature than other forms of employer conduct
that is not actionable? Delving into the psychological research into the
nature of retaliation and the special harms that retaliation has upon the law’s
ability to combat workplace discrimination, this Part concludes that the
assertions are, in fact, justified.

235

Johnson v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 557 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
Another example is Frankhouser v. Clearfield County Career and Technology Center,
Case No. 3:18-cv-180, 2019 WL 1259570 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2019), in which an employer
allegedly retaliated against an employee who reported sexual harassment through
“enhanced job scrutiny and generally negative and unfavorable behavior.” Id. at *17.
236
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
237
Johnson, 557 N.E.2d at 331.
238
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book IX, Line 171 (1667).
239
See Hoy, 720 A.2d at 754; supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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A. The Nature of Retaliation
1. The Nature of Retaliation in General
As one author who has studied retaliation at length puts it, “there’s no
better way to ensure that someone is going to harm you than to harm him or
her first.”240 The desire to retaliate against those who have committed some
perceived wrong or injustice against us is deeply ingrained.241 As an
example, one study into the physiology of retaliation measured the brain
activities of participants in a game in which one of the participants had
double crossed the other participants.242 Researchers found that the thought
of punishing the wrongdoer for this transgression triggered the reward
center of the brain that is closely associated with pleasure.243
One reason why the desire to retaliate is so deeply ingrained is perhaps
because of the important function retaliation served in early human
evolution. Retaliation is largely defined in terms of revenge and
punishment.244 One who retaliates against another for the other’s supposed
wrongful conduct may be motivated by a desire to make oneself feel better
by making the perceived wrongdoer suffer or to deter similar wrongful
conduct moving forward.245 Evolutionary psychologists posit that revenge
or retaliation may have served adaptive functions related to deterrence.246
Our early ancestors could not afford to be seen as being an easy target to be
240

MICHAEL MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND REVENGE 28 (2008).
See generally id. at 10 (stating “the desire for revenge is a universal trait of human
nature, crafted by natural selection, that exists today because it was adaptive in the
ancestral environment in which the human species evolved”).
242
DJ de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCI. 1254,
1255 (2004).
243
Id.
244
See Retaliate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (defining the term in terms of “to
return like for like; especially: to get revenge), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/retaliate; Retaliation, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY
(defining the term in terms of punishment), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/retaliation;
Frank D. LoMonte & Clay Calver, The Open Mic, Unplugged: Challenges to ViewpointBased Constraints on Public-Comment Periods, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 61 (2018)
(discussing retaliation in terms of punishment); Karina Schumann and Michael Ross, The
Benefits, Costs, and Paradox of Revenge, 4 SOC. AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
1193, 1194 (2010) (listing deterrence as one of the functions of retaliation),
https://web.stanford.edu/~omidf/KarinaSchumann/KarinaSchumann_Home/Publications_fi
les/Schumann.SPPC.2010.pdf.
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Schumann and Ross, supra note 244, at 1194; see also Dale T. Miller, Disrespect
and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 527, 541 (2001) (explaining
that retaliation may serve to convey to others the idea that one “does not tolerate unjust
treatment by others”).
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See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 240, at 49–56.
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taken advantage of in terms of food, shelter, or other necessities. In order to
prevent outsiders or those within a group from engaging in aggression at
our expense, it was necessary to let others know that there would be
transaction costs associated with doing so.247 Therefore, retaliating against
one who we perceived as having wronged us served as a means of deterring
the perceived wrongdoer from trying the same thing in the future.248
Similarly, retaliation against a perceived wrongdoer also served as a threat
to future would-be transgressors that there would be consequences for
wrongdoing.249 The failure to retaliate in the face of aggression potentially
made survival more difficult.
Modern studies illustrate the important role that retaliation and the
threat of retaliation play in deterring future unwanted behavior. In one
study, undergraduate students wrote an essay, which was graded harshly by
a reviewer acting in concert with the researchers.250 Later, the same
students were presented with the ability to administer (what they believed
were) electric shocks of increasing intensity to their reviewer. Half of the
participants were told that the roles would later be reversed and that the
reviewer would be able to administer electric shocks to the students. The
other half were not told that the roles would later be reversed. The
participants who believed they could shock with impunity generally gave
stronger shocks to their reviewers than those who believed the reviewers
would later have the ability to retaliate.251 Thus, the threat of retaliation on
the part of the reviewers had a deterrent effect on the severity of the
retaliation the participants were willing to inflict.252
In addition to illustrating the deterrent effect that the threat of retaliation
may have, this study also perhaps illustrates the strong drive humans have
to retaliate. Several studies suggest that retaliators are often motivated by a
desire to exact revenge and to “balance the moral ledger.”253 Interestingly,
247

See id. at 50.
See id.
249
See id. at 51.
250
See id. at 50–51 (citing S.R. Diamond, The Effect of Fear on the Aggressive
Responses of Anger Aroused and Revenge Motivated Subjects, 95 J. PSYCHOL. 185 (1977)).
251
See id. at 51 (citing S.R. Diamond, The Effect of Fear on the Aggressive Responses
of Anger Aroused and Revenge Motivated Subjects, 95 J. PSYCHOL. 185 (1977)).
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See id.
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See Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Paradoxical Consequences of Revenge, 95
INTERPERSONAL REL. AND GROUP PROCESSES 1316, 1323 (2008) (“Our findings support a
functional account of punishment—people use punishment to strategically repair their
negative mood.”) [hereinafter Carlsmith, Paradoxical Consequences]; Kevin M. Carlsmith
et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295 (2002) (summarizing results of study finding
that “just deserts” perspective motivated individuals more than deterrence justification
when assigning punishment) [hereinafter Carlsmith et al., Why do We Punish?]. See
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the research indicates that acting on this desire actually has the potential to
cause physical as well as mental harm for the retaliator.254
2. The Nature of Retaliation in the Workplace
Workplace retaliation is closely associated with abuse of power. The
perceived need to seek retribution for a perceived wrong is positively
correlated with the values of power and authority.255 In other words, power
asymmetry influences the likelihood of workplace retaliation; workers who
enjoy higher status than their transgressors are more likely to act on the urge
to take revenge than their counterparts.256 One logical explanation for this
phenomenon is that those who enjoy higher status also enjoy the
connections and resources that make it less likely that they will suffer
adverse consequences for their retaliatory conduct.257 In contrast, those
who enjoy less status may be less inclined to take revenge out of necessity.
Thus, those with power in the workplace are able to flaunt it by retaliating
against those who challenge that power.258
Status also matters in terms of who is most likely to be on the receiving
end of retaliatory conduct and how likely it is that the conduct will deter
future unwanted conduct. Not surprisingly, those with lower status in the
generally MCCULLOUGH, supra note 240, at 48 (explaining that some social scientists
attribute the desire to seek revenge to an attempt to “balance a moral ledger that has
become lopsided”). A 2008 study found that participants who had the ability to retaliate
against a perceived wrongdoer and who acted upon that ability felt worse than those who
lacked the ability to punish the transgressor. See Carlsmith, Paradoxical Consequences,
supra note 253, at 1323.
254
As a physiological matter, thoughts of vengeance lead to increases in blood
pressure and heart rate, which suggests that people who hold grudges for years may
experience long-term health consequences. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 240, at 7
(reporting results of studies). Research also suggests that prolonged thoughts of retaliation
are associated with a host of psychological disorders, such as negative affect and
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, psychiatric morbidity, and reduced
life satisfaction. See Schumann and Ross, supra note 244, at 1196.
255
See Ian R. McKee & N.T. Feather, Revenge, Retribution, and Values: Social
Attitudes and Punitive Sentencing, 21 SOC. JUST. 138, 149–50 (2008).
256
See Karl Aquino, How Employees Respond to Personal Offense: The Effects of
Blame Attribution, Victim Status, and Offender Status on Revenge and Reconciliation in the
Workplace, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 52, 53 (2001) (discussing studies addressing the
effects of the urge for revenge in the workplace).
257
See Schumann and Ross, supra note 244, at 1199.
258
See generally Ann C. Wendt and William M. Slonaker, Sexual Harassment and
Retaliation: A Double-Edged Sword, 67 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 49 (2002) (“If
harassment displays power over another, then retaliation flaunts power.”),
https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?v=2.1&it=r&sw=w&id=GALE%7CA94465279&prodId=AON
E&sid=googleScholarFullText&userGroupName=tel_main&isGeoAuthType=true.
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workplace are particularly likely to be the targets of retaliation.259 Higherranking employees who complain of wrongdoing are less likely to face
organizational retaliation.260
B. The Detrimental Impact of Retaliation and Discrimination
Taking revenge on a perceived wrongdoer may produce a host of
negative psychological outcomes for victims, particularly when the
retaliation is coupled with discriminatory conduct. Employees who
suppress anger in the face of perceived mistreatment by one in a position of
power are more likely to experience negative psychological and
physiological effects, such as feelings of humiliation and resentment, the
inability to remove the negative incident from their mind, and raised blood
pressure and heart disease.261 Numerous authors have noted the sense of
humiliation that often accompanies workplace discrimination and
harassment.262 The research suggests that such feelings are also likely to
accompany retaliation.
In contrast, those who are able to express concerns they may have about
the workplace to their superiors without experiencing retribution are more
likely to have positive feeling about their workplaces. For example, a study
of over 1,000 employees found that employees who were able to give voice
to their concerns about having been mistreated and avoid retaliation for
having done so were more positive about their jobs than those who had
remained silent about mistreatment.263 Employees with a significant history
259
See Brake, supra note 18, at 39 (noting that “low-power persons are particularly
susceptible to retaliation”); J.P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistle-Blowing Process:
Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORGS. SCI., 393, 403 (1993)
(concluding that whistle blowers who have less power in the workplace may be more likely
to experience retaliation).
260
See Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents
and Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 236
(2002). The relationship between the parties and the severity of the perceived injustice also
influence the severity of the retaliation. For example, a 2019 study found that when one
co-worker wrongs another, the wronged co-worker is likely to retaliate in a proportional,
eye-for-an-eye manner rather than escalating the conflict through more severe forms of
retaliation. See Lindsey Greco et al., An Eye for an Eye? A Meta-Analysis of Negative
Reciprocity in Organizations, 104 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 14 (2019). Thus, low-intensity coworker misconduct (such as incivility) is likely to be met with a proportionally mild
response that is similar in kind to the original wrongdoing. See id. at 2. More severe
wrongdoing (such as aggression or physical violence) is likely to be met with similarly
severe retaliation. See id.
261
See Leora Eisenstadt & Deanna Geddes, Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine,
and Workplace Culture, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 147, 182 (2017).
262
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
263
See Cortina and Magley, supra note 280, at 258.
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of prior mistreatment and who faced retaliation after voicing opposition to
the mistreatment reported higher levels of psychological and physical
problems than those who had experienced retaliation after less intense
mistreatment.264 But the group reporting the highest level of psychological
and physical problems were those with a significant history of prior
mistreatment and who remained silent about the mistreatment rather than
complaining.265 Given the distress that often accompanies being the victim
of discrimination, being the victim of retaliation after having opposed such
misconduct is only likely to increase the psychological harm one
experiences.
Employees who complain about discrimination or other forms of
workplace misconduct may experience other forms of distress aside from
humiliation. For example, it is well-established that one of the main
reasons why employees do not complain about unlawful discrimination and
other forms of employer misconduct is the fear of creating disharmony in
the workplace and facing retaliation from co-workers.266 When reporting
wrongdoing occurring within an organization, an employee may feel a sense
of disloyalty, as if coming forward with such information is a betrayal of
the organization. This is also obviously how the employee’s action is
sometimes perceived. So, it is perhaps not surprising that those who report
or oppose unlawful conduct are particularly susceptible to emotional
distress stemming from retaliation, including depression and related
conditions.267 For example, one study of corporate whistleblowers found
that most experienced retaliation and 10% stated they attempted suicide.268
In short, there is ample support for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
observation that retaliatory conduct is likely to have a greater detrimental
impact upon a victim than other forms of employer misconduct, at least
where the retaliation is in response to opposition to discrimination or
harassment.
C. The Severity of Retaliatory and Discriminatory Conduct
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also observed, retaliatory
conduct is typically indicative of discrimination of a more severe nature
264

Id. at 262.
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266
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Relationships and Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 72
FLA. L. REV. 797, 816–19 (2020) (summarizing scholarship in the field).
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See Miriam Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1053 (2004)
(“Due to the extreme stress, many whistleblowers develop serious mental illness, such as
depression, which can lead to other problems, such as alcohol or drug abuse.”).
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David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 113 (1995).
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than “mere” discrimination or harassment. Workplace retaliation in
response to opposition to discrimination or harassment certainly has a
detrimental impact on victims. But it also has a potential detrimental
impact on workplace culture and helps perpetuate discrimination in the
workplace. These features increase the overall severity of such conduct.
1. The Impact of Retaliation Upon Workplace Culture
The effect that retaliation may have upon the culture of a workplace is a
factor that increases the severity of the conduct. The fear of retaliation and
resulting silence may have negative consequences for the workplace as a
whole. In every organization, there is a “psychological contract” that
contains the unwritten expectations of the relationship, most notably the
employer-employee relationship.269 The idea of unwritten interpersonal
codes of conduct may extend to co-workers within an organization.270 A
perceived breach committed by a member of one’s own group is different
than a perceived offense committed by one from outside the group. In the
former instance, the perceived offense is more likely to produce a sense of
betrayal and disrespect.271 And in the specific case of a perceived offense
by a person of higher-status within the same group—such as a supervisor—
the perceived offense is more likely to be perceived as an abuse of power.272
These are situations in which the perceived victim may feel that retribution
is called for in order to rectify the breach of the psychological contract and
even the moral ledger.
Employees with lower status who feel they have been mistreated by
those who outrank them may displace retaliation onto others within the
269

See Miller, supra note 245, at 532 (“A psychological contract is an implicit
understanding of what is and is not acceptable in a relationship.”); Denise M. Rousseau,
Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organisations, 2 EMP. RESPS. AND RTS. J. 121, 123
(1989) (defining the concept in terms of “an individual’s beliefs regarding the terms and
conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal person and another
party”).
270
See Miller, supra note 245, at 530 (discussing feelings of betrayal stemming from
violations of interpersonal codes of conduct by co-workers).
271
See Miller, supra note 172, at 539 (noting the different responses to offenses
committed by in-group members versus out-group members); Janice Anna Knights &
Barbara Jean Kennedy, Psychological Contract Violation: Impacts on Job Satisfaction and
Organizational Commitment Among Australian Senior Public Servants, 10 APPLIED
H.R.M. RES. 57, 58 (2005) (noting that breach of a psychological contract produces
“feelings of betrayal, distress, anger, resentment, a sense of injustice and wrongful harm”).
272
See Miller, supra note 245, at 539 (stating that “in the case of a higher-status person
the source of the indignation will generally be the belief that the offender has abused his or
her position”).
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organization or the organization as a whole in passive ways that are more
difficult to detect, such as putting less effort into work or being absent from
work more often.273 Employees who feel they are not free to express their
unhappiness with mistreatment to management may instead seek out
sympathetic co-workers with whom they can express their unhappiness.274
This may in turn to lead to so-called “negative emotional contagion,” a
phenomenon in which the negative attitudes and emotions of one person
spread within an organization.275 Employees who feel silenced may engage
in their own forms of retaliatory conduct against employers when
confronted with what they perceive to be injustices.276 In some cases, the
retaliation is minor in nature, such as physical withdrawal in the workplace
or workplace absences.277 In others, the retaliation may be more
substantial, such as vandalism, theft from the employer, and resisting
organizational authority—and in some cases extreme—as in the case of
workplace violence.278 Indeed, studies have found that incidences of
workplace violence are higher in workplaces where employees feel they are
treated with disrespect.279
2. Retaliatory Conduct as a Means of Perpetuating Discrimination and
Harassment
Finally, the fact that retaliation tends to deter others from coming
273

See Greco et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 4–5, 16.
Eisenstadt & Geddes, supra note 274, at 183.
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Aggression, in 23 MONOGRAPHS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 47 (1998) (noting that if managerial decision making and actions are perceived
as unfair, employees may feel resentment and a desire to seek retribution); Greco et al.,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2 (noting various forms of retaliatory
negative work behavior directed toward the organization); Daniel P. Skarlicki & Robert
Folger, Retaliation in the Workplace: The Roles of Distributive, Procedural, and
Interactional Justice, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 434, 434 (1997) (reporting results of study
finding that “when employees felt exploited by the company, they were more likely to
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of injustice”).
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forward with concerns over discrimination and harassment, thereby
impeding efforts to eliminate workplace discrimination, is a factor that
increases the severity of the conduct. Retaliation or the threat of retaliation
may have a strong deterrent effect on those who would raise concerns about
the organization’s actions and treatment of others. Complaints by a lowerranking employee about misbehavior on the part of a higher-ranking
individual may be seen by the organization as a challenge to authority.280
Retaliation on the part of the organization or the higher-ranking individual
in such a case may serve to maintain the hierarchical structure of the
workplace.281
Weak legal protection from retaliation makes it more likely that
workplace discrimination and harassment will go unaddressed. Therefore,
retaliation has a detrimental impact not only upon its victims and coworkers but upon the structures in place designed to prevent discrimination.
Ultimately, these external harms increase the overall severity and add to the
overall outrageousness of retaliatory conduct involving complaints of
discrimination.
CONCLUSION

As currently applied by most courts, the IIED tort has a limited role to
play in the fight against discrimination. In light of the more severe nature
of workplace discrimination and harassment involving retaliatory conduct
and the greater detrimental impact that such conduct is likely to have, courts
should follow the approach of those courts that treat retaliatory conduct as a
critical and prominent factor in assessing the extreme and outrageous nature
of the conduct. By doing so, courts can take the IIED tort off of the bench
and put it into the game of combatting workplace discrimination.
To be clear, not every case involving discrimination and retaliation will
necessarily amount to extreme and outrageous conduct or perhaps even
raise a jury question.282 Even where courts give special weight to the fact of
280

See Lily M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events
Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 247, 249 (2003) (“[E]xposing the misbehavior of a highly placed member of the
organizational hierarchy—thus characterizing that person as unlawful, unethical, or
inappropriate—questions that hierarchy.”).
281
See id. (stating the organization’s dominant culture “may therefore retaliate against
the victim to correct this challenge to authority”); Near et al., supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 404 (explaining that whistleblowers question “the basic
authority structure of the organization by calling its managers incompetent or unethical—a
situation most likely to result in retaliation because the authority structure of the
organization has been challenged”).
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retaliation, there will be many instances in which the conduct in question is
not sufficiently egregious to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to
recognize workplace IIED claims. This is most likely to be the case where
an employer engages in traditional forms of discrimination, such as a failure
to promote, where the employer’s actions lie at the core of the employment
at-will rule and courts have been especially unlikely to permit recovery.283
But harassment presents a different situation, one in which the conduct
in question has little to do with employer prerogative. Considering the acts
of harassment and retaliation as part of a continuing pattern of action and
treating the fact of retaliation as a particularly weighty factor may lead to
more positive outcomes for some plaintiffs whose success is not likely
under Title VII. Some courts have expressed a greater inclination to permit
IIED claims against individual supervisors or co-workers than against a
plaintiff’s ultimate employer.284 Therefore, the approach described in this
Article is most likely to have its greatest impact in the case of individual
supervisor liability where a clear gap in statutory law currently exists. A
jury question as to the extreme and outrageous nature of conduct might also
exist in some cases where an employer encourages or tolerates co-worker
retaliation against an employee who has complained of unlawful
harassment.
In keeping with the approach described by the Pennsylvania and Illinois
courts, retaliatory conduct should be a weighty factor in the determination
of whether conduct is extreme and outrageous. And where the plaintiff is a
victim of both harassment and retaliation in response to complaints of such
harassment, a jury question should ordinarily exist with respect to an IIED
claim.

3217183, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2009) (dismissing claim under Pennsylvania’s
approach).
283
See William R. Corbett, “You’re Fired!”: The Common Law Should Respond with
the Refashioned Tort of Abusive Discharge, 41 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 63, 112
(2020) (stating that the “large body of case law finding that discharges are not outrageous
because employers are exercising their lawful right is too powerful to overcome”).
284
See Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp., 35 P.3d 1158, 1163 (Wash. 2001) (stating that
plaintiff may have had a claim against supervisor but instead brought claim against
employer).
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